

# *Fernando Filgueira*

## **Social Protection, Family and the Crossroads of Inter and Intra-Generational Solidarity in Developing Unequal Societies Challenges for Latin America**

### **1. Families: abstract or historically grounded definitions**

In order to speak of family policy, we first have to address the delicate matter of what we conceive as family or families and their functions. Families can be defined by their functions. Such is an elegant way, but one not without its perils, to avoid problems of historically and culturally grounded and thus biased definitions. But we should first attempt at least an ontological definition of family, so as to separate it from other social arrangements and specially from other stable systems of interaction of people (workplaces, parties, collective households, prisons).

The definition to be attempted bears a very distant resemblance to the legal definitions of family that most states explicitly address. By no means do we imply by this that legal definitions of family are irrelevant. They are very important but they are not meant to provide analytical tools to understand this type of groupings and their role in society, but rather to sustain and discipline the population into some of the versions that these groupings assume. A sociological definition of family has to recognize in its basic concepts the broad variety of social arrangements that can be understood as a distinct social arrangement, but encompassing the relevant variations. In the end this is a typical “boundaries” exercise of “class”. Establishing common denominators that once recognized empirically allow us to say that this apparently very different things should be called a family always has to be tested on logical and empirical grounds. Such is in the end the role of theory: accumulated research that put together tells us something about how to classify the world and the find relations between these classes of things. Of course normative and historically grounded dimensions will always enter our definitions. We choose a definition that operates through difference and probabilistic identity. In other words our definition excludes certain things and then approximates what are the common denominators that should be present.

A simple definition of what families are can be attempted. Families are closely knit social groups bounded by relations of parentesco (which in part at least are usually based on forms of blood lineage and/or stable bonding and dwelling) that share, distribute and reproduce material resources based on statuses, roles, power and norms of reciprocity that fall outside the dynamics of markets and states (though are influenced by these spheres). Furthermore families are a distinct historical institutional arrangements that in different times and spaces tend to assume certain stable features in terms of division of roles, typical integration and central norms and behaviors. They are usually intergenerational and almost across all cultures a central (though by not means the only)

type of family involves reproduction and caring for offspring.

This definition of family is both insufficient and imperfect. But it is a working definition that we believe has the sufficient scope to accept many concrete forms of this type of social arrangement and at the same time excludes other relevant forms that should not be confused or conflated with family. Beside the definition, we are particularly interested in the role that this institution of family has on the broader society. In particular we are interested in its role and interactions vis a vis markets and states and in its role regarding the political economy of gender and generational distribution of power, welfare and risk.

Families like no other social institutions condense and reproduce social values and relations. They are also the essential distributional unit of society, both at the micro level and as the central intermediary agent between individuals, markets and states at the macro-level. Families represent again like no other the meeting point of inter and intra-generational distributional contracts.

- a. Families at the micro level constitute both the locus of solidarity and inequality, of reciprocal action and domination.
- b. Families at the micro level provide the basic ingredients for sense of belonging and emotional support and at the same time can be major factors affecting alienation and emotional distress
- c. Families at the macro-level constitute a general form of inter-generational solidarity and a mechanism for the stratification along gender, age and class.
- d. Family boundaries can furthermore be understood as the space where the definitions of what is public and private become contested and reshaped.

It is important to note that social protection systems and family policies can reinforce any of the micro or macro level functions of families.

If the points made above are true, then rather than defining family policy as direct or indirect we should go about defining the family implications of policy in general and of social policy in particular. If there is a distinction to be made in terms of policy it should be one of intent and historical boundaries. Some policies are aimed at supporting certain family types and certain family functions in given historical situations (and are recognized explicitly as pursuing such aims), while others, that no doubt had at some point a closer link to family “intent” have now become sufficiently institutionalized outside of family functions and types so as to be perceived as separate from or lacking a direct explicit link to families. But one would be hard pressed to isolate or identify policies that have no effects on families.

Now if our question is policies that are meant to have a particular effect on a particular type of family, then of course we could differentiate between family policy and other policies. But if

in doing so we then only concentrate on what would be labeled explicit family policy we would impoverish both the wide array of policies that affect families, and the wide array of families that are affected by policies.

What we do believe is an interesting undertaking is to identify, within the broad array of policies that affect families, those that are explicitly aimed at dealing with the transformation of families themselves or the conditions under which families operate. In this sense, policies that recognize the changing landscape of family arrangements, and the links of its members to the labor market and to the state is an interesting subfield within the broader concerns of evaluating social protection policies in light of family in general.

## **2. The notion of risk, welfare regime and the place of policy and family in it.**

All societies distribute social risks between men and women, rich and poor, educated and non-educated, children, adults and old people in a differential way. There is a political economy of social risk. Markets, families and communities distribute wealth, security and opportunities differentially according to fixed and acquired attributes of the population (Esping Andersen 2002). These three channels of production and distribution of wealth, security and opportunities are based on an essentially de-centralized rationale. Individuals decide whether they use, add and put into good use their assets in terms of physical, human and social capital. In doing so, they are establishing general parameters of supply, demand and prices, family arrangements and territorial distribution of the population. These parameters will determine future possibilities of making use of existing opportunity structure.

But there is another sphere of production of wealth, security and opportunities: the state. This is an essentially centralized sphere. The state plays three basic roles: collecting resources from the community, distribution and allocation of resources in the community and regulation of acceptable and non-acceptable behavior. The state also intervenes with incentives in the working of the three de-centralized spheres, market, families and community (Przeworski 2003). In other words, states determine people chances because states control the tax systems, the public expenditures and the laws which regulate interactions among people and groups (whether market, families or communities).

The articulation between state, markets and families make up for what is known as a welfare regime (Esping Andersen 1990, 1999). This definition departs from the one that accounts only for the social policies of the state. A welfare regime is more than a set of social state instruments. It is the intersection of a risk production structure and a market, family and state architecture of social protection against risks. It also includes the regulation of the risk produced by de-centralized structures. Given this perspective, states are not to be assessed solely in normative terms, according to their level of expenditure or even in comparative terms. A key feature to assess social policies

and social states is how states respond to the risk structures and the distribution of risks. This conceptual road leads to the definition of social risk.

All individuals go through risk situations in terms of material and emotional welfare. Social risk does not refer to the presence or absence of random risk but to the idea of empirical recurrences in which is possible to identify the connection between social vulnerability and certain population categories (according to different criteria such as age, gender, social class, educational level, life course, etc). Young couples face the risks of poverty due to the start of both their productive and reproductive cycle, the elderly face other challenges related to their physical and emotional decline combined with their increased isolation from the market, their families and their communities, children face the risks related to their family dependence and adolescents must solve the challenges of emancipation. These risk structures are predetermined and exist in the majority of societies.

But, it is clear that societies vary in the type and amount of the production and distribution of the social risks named above. Also, societies vary in the usage of social devices and the social capacity to minimize, moderate, compensate or simply deal with these risk situations (Esping-Andersen 2002, Huber and Stephens 2004). A country which concentrates its new births in young low income mothers is radically different to one that concentrates its new births in its middle class or older women. Old people who live in societies with strong family solidarity networks will find themselves less isolated than those in societies with weak family units in terms of care and resources. Also, a country where women are mostly employed in the formal labor market is different to one where women depend on the rent of the male head of family.

Now, there are collective responses carried out by the state and its social policies to this “natural” production of social risks. To speak of centralized response to natural risks is merely an analytical resource. Social risk, its quantity and intensity among different population categories is necessarily a product of de-centralized agents in the market, families and communities and the centralized action of the state. There is nothing intrinsically “natural” in the way markets, families and communities produce and distribute quantities and qualities of risk. The existing dynamics result from parameters institutionally defined by the state and by cultural beliefs rooted in long term incentives and legal norms. At the same time, State decisions are not characterized by its “artificiality” but by being binding and authoritative (Przeworski 2003). Markets and communities generate aggregated parameters which will become structural constraints for actions and opportunities later. But they do not make decisions related to the collection and distribution of resources and the regulation of behavior which are legally binding. This is, beyond doubt, the role of the state alone.

Therefore, states contribute with differential actions to the risk production structure (Esping-Andersen 2002) and to the distribution of the care-giving responsibilities. When doing so, they affect

the risk, care distribution and intergenerational solidarity strongly. The unprotected old people of the low solidarity models will be protected in the social states where there exists universal coverage of rent and social services for the elderly. The children will depend less on their families' fortunes and misfortunes in countries with preschool and full time school are universal. Divorced women who depend economically on their ex-husbands will be more protected if there is state regulation of the economic transfers between ex-partners and if there are support systems for the female headed households.

This conception of social risk and care-giving is behind the main thesis of this work. As families and markets change, the distribution, type and quantity of social risks and the devices for social protection change as well. Since states are part of the risk production structure and the protection system, they should contribute to answer to emergent risks. When this does not happen, there are two possible outcomes: families, communities and/or markets undertake adaptive processes and absorb such risks, or, non covered risks increase both in quality and quantity for certain social groups.

For families, communities and markets to take certain actions and absorb risks, certain conditions must be fulfilled. Families must have available adult resources (time included), stability and cooperation among members; communities must have basic forms of reciprocity and trust anchored in minimal normative efficiency that might support more complex cooperation dynamics. Finally, market agents must perceive potential profit associated to a given opportunity of risk absorption.

When these conditions are not fulfilled, those risks which the state does not address will not find answers in adaptative modalities of markets, families and communities. An array of problems will affect deeply the social health of individuals, families and countries:


- a. Intra generational trap: individuals do not have access to mobility channels from the market, state or family.
- b. Intergenerational trap: the descendents of vulnerable groups inherit disadvantages
- c. Increase of events potentially catastrophic: sudden processes of descending social mobility generated by non addressed risks which leave individuals out of resources, collective protection and incapable of mobilizing social assets.
- d. Inter and Intra-generational breakdown of solidarity and cohesion. Free rider and individualistic solutions tend to dominate adaptation strategies. Cooperative behavior among family members and individuals reaches a suboptimal level for aggregated welfare.
- e. Zero sum solutions start to dominate, conflict increases both between and within generations and sexes, at the family, community and national level.

In this sense, the urban more demographically developed part of Latin America constitutes a test case scenario for the challenges confronting social protection regarding three major changes in the social structure: increasing labor market participation of women, changes in family arrangements, and population ageing. These three developments bring to the fore the problem of intergenerational solidarity, gender distributional conflicts and very saliently care and economies of care, as well as the impact of these new challenges on welfare policy financial sustainability and fertility rates in the population. In addition it adds a whole new arena where opportunity and welfare are redistributed due to the interaction of family transformation, labor participation of women and gender and generational distributional conflicts. Put more simply, where men work for wages, women do it in the household and in care for others, ageing is limited and families with two parents tend to last close to a lifetime, the issue of who does what is settled. Men work, women take care of the house and children, and the elderly take care of themselves or are taken care of by women in extended households. Also opportunity and welfare are distributed in relatively settled terms, dependent on male position and marriage patterns. Finally a contributory welfare model build for stable two parent male breadwinner families in a labor market close to full formal employment is burst asunder in its efficacy and financial basis when both labor markets and families change.

No matter how much we are to question the idealized version of welfare regimes in Latin America (both on empirical and normative grounds), data indicates that the last thirty years have moved further away from this version of family and labor markets (increased female headed households, a steep increase in divorces, more unemployment and informality within male population, and increased rates of female labor participation in also increasingly informal labor markets).


Among the different and many problems that this decoupling of social structure and social protection creates, the issue of care and intergenerational solidarity becomes central. As women enter the labor force, as population ages and as family arrangements change, issues such as who shoulders the burden of care, how policies help reconcile work and family, and how state services and state interventions confront these challenges, become salient topics, and they enter fully and visibly the distributional conflicts and agenda of state, policies and politics. When the new demands are not met by policy or other potential responses women, children and society at large suffers.

## Negative effects of the demand overburden due to paid and unpaid work resting in the shoulders of women




There are of course potential response to this state of affairs, not all of which imply a state response. The problem with some of the alternatives presented below is that they affect presently or inter-temporally the aggregate welfare of society while at the same time limiting the options and welfare alternatives of women.

## Potential adaptive responses in analytical terms




More importantly, societies are not homogenous and in the absence of state responses to this problem the likely adaptive behaviors will be differentiated across class lines contributing in general to an increase in social inheritance of inequality.

**Stratified responses to crises of care and women's double shift in the absence of robust state responses (listed in order of importance for each sector)**



As welfare regimes confront these problems, four alternatives become possible: market solutions to care and protection, state provided solutions to care and protection, redistribution of care burdens and protection among males and females and generations in families and collective non-state solutions (third sector and community solutions). Family policy or social protection policy with family implications is of course dominant when we speak of the second type of solution, but it is also very relevant in affecting the access to market solutions, community actions and within family redistribution of responsibilities for care and protection, as well as the capacity of families to provide such care and protection.

## Potential state responses to the double demand of paid and unpaid work



Latin America presents certain peculiarities that make the reconstruction of social protection systems an extremely hard task, both politically and technically. Social Policy that comes to terms with family transformation and ageing and gender policy that assumes center stage in the design of family oriented policy are critical in order to have some chance of success in promoting intergenerational solidarity and social cohesion.

### 3. Inequality, urbanization, age structure and Family in Latin America

No region with the possible exception of Subsaharan Africa is as unequal in terms of income distribution as Latin America is. Such a trait alone sets it apart from the rest of the developing world. But if we carry a more systematic analysis of the region in terms of socio-demographic development other specificities come to the fore. In carrying out this exercise we have to be careful not to confound level and type. Latin America has countries at various levels of socioeconomic development. If we were to carry out a classification of Latin American countries by level they would separate in three distinct groups and each sub-region would pair itself with other developing regions or sub-regions. Indeed countries such as Argentina and Chile at the high human development level would share that position with countries such as Korea, Singapore, Poland and others, while Guatemala and Honduras would share the middle to low human development index with countries such as Vietnam, Uzbekistan, Argelia and others.


Countries and their levels of human development at the beginning of the millennium.

|   | <b>Mean</b> |
|---|-------------|
| <b>Income group high and high HDI</b>               |             |
| Asian tigers  | 0,898       |
| Eastern Europe                                      | 0,850       |
| Latin America                                       | 0,839       |
| <b>Income group medium-high and medium-high HDI</b> |             |
| Arabian Peninsula                                   | 0,783       |
| Latin America                                       | 0,778       |
| Eastern Europe                                      | 0,773       |
| Asian tigers  | 0,765       |
| <b>Income group medium-low – medium-low HDI</b>     |             |
| Latin America                                       | 0,695       |
| Eastern Europe                                      | 0,691       |
| Future Asian power                                  | 0,684       |
| Northern Africa                                     | 0,681       |


Source: Filgueira (2007) based UNDP (2004).

But if instead of classifying levels of development we want to classify types or profiles of social and demographic development we would want to run cluster analysis within each level with a same set of potentially discriminatory variables. We are particularly interested in inequality, fertility, age structure, urbanization and family arrangements.

Is Latin America unique, does it have a particular configuration of sociodemographic and economic variables that suggest a need to think our policies within that context? The answer is a definite yes, even-though some cases do not fall within this Latin American macro-constellation.



Source: Filgueira (2007)



**Medium Human development countries: selected variables for sub-regions (in %)**

| Region            | Net primary Enrolment rate (2000-2001) | Active population (2002) | Child dependency ratio (2002) | Old-age dependency ratio (65 years and older) (2002) |
|-------------------|--|--------------------------|-------------------------------|--|
| Arabian Peninsula | 85,9000                                | 63,7909                  | 0,5408                        | 0,0456   |
| Asian Tigers      | 91,7500                                | 65,0000                  | 0,4650                        | 0,0795   |
| Latin America     | 96,0909                                | 63,2545                  | 0,4998                        | 0,0844   |
| Eastern Europe    | 92,3333                                | 67,5308                  | 0,3246                        | 0,1588   |
| <b>Total</b>      | <b>89,8000</b>                         | <b>65,0103</b>           | <b>0,4494</b>                 | <b>0,0978</b>  |

**Selected indicators for Medium human development countries by sub-regions (in %)**

| Region            | Total Fertility rate (2000-2005) | Mortality rate for children under 5 (2002) | Richest 10% / Poorest 10% | Urban Population (2002) |
|-------------------|----------------------------------|--|---------------------------|-------------------------|
| Arabian Peninsula | 3,5091                           | 20,8182                                    | 9,0303                    | 84,6364                 |
| Asian Tigers      | 2,4500                           | 28,2500                                    | 17,7493                   | 56,6000                 |
| Latin America     | 2,5636                           | 26,4167                                    | 48,4502                   | 69,8500                 |
| Eastern Europe    | 1,6000                           | 39,6154                                    | 9,2801                    | 60,6462                 |
| <b>Total</b>      | <b>2,4974</b>                    | <b>29,3500</b>                             | <b>24,4704</b>            | <b>69,6000</b>          |

**Analysis Clusters for medium-low human development countries**

| Country                         | 4 Clusters | 3 Clusters | 2 Clusters |
|---------------------------------|------------|------------|------------|
| 174 Uzbekistán                  | 4          | 3          | 2          |
| 175 Kirguistán                  | 4          | 3          | 2          |
| 177 Tayikistán                  | 4          | 3          | 2          |
| <b>160 Ecuador</b>              | <b>2</b>   | <b>2</b>   | <b>1</b>   |
| <b>161 El Salvador</b>          | <b>2</b>   | <b>2</b>   | <b>1</b>   |
| <b>171 Honduras</b>             | <b>2</b>   | <b>2</b>   | <b>1</b>   |
| <b>172 Nicaragua</b>            | <b>2</b>   | <b>2</b>   | <b>1</b>   |
| <b>173 Guatemala</b>            | <b>2</b>   | <b>2</b>   | <b>1</b>   |
| <b>159 República Dominicana</b> | <b>1</b>   | <b>1</b>   | <b>1</b>   |
| 163 Túnez                       | 1          | 1          | 1          |
| 164 Argelia                     | 1          | 1          | 1          |
| 165 Egipto                      | 1          | 1          | 1          |
| 166 Marruecos                   | 1          | 1          | 1          |
| 167 Indonesia                   | 1          | 1          | 1          |
| 168 Vietnam                     | 1          | 1          | 1          |
| 169 Mongolia                    | 3          | 1          | 1          |
| <b>170 Bolivia</b>              | <b>3</b>   | <b>1</b>   | <b>1</b>   |
| 176 República de Moldavia       | 1          | 1          | 1          |

**Medium-low Human development countries: selected variables for sub-regions (in %)**

| Region              | Net primary Enrolment rate (2000-2001) | Active population (2002) | Child dependency ratio (2002) | Old-age dependency ratio (65 years and older) (2002) |
|---------------------|--|--------------------------|-------------------------------|--|
| Nothern Africa      | 92,5000                                | 62,9750                  | 0,5138                        | 0,0757   |
| Future Asian Tigers | 91,0000                                | 63,6333                  | 0,4970                        | 0,0749   |
| Latin America       | 90,8571                                | 57,8714                  | 0,6610                        | 0,0727   |
| Eastern Europe      | 91,0000                                | 62,1500                  | 0,5142                        | 0,1018   |
| <b>Total</b>        | <b>91,2941</b>                         | <b>60,9167</b>           | <b>0,5683</b>                 | <b>0,0802</b>  |


**Selected indicators for Medium-Low human development countries by sub-regions (in %)**

| Region              | Total Fertility rate (2000-2005) | Mortality rate for children under 5 (2002) | Richest 10% / Poorest 10% | Urban Population (2002) |
|---------------------|----------------------------------|--|---------------------------|-------------------------|
| Nothern Africa      | 2,7000                           | 39,7500                                    | 10,7812                   | 60,7750                 |
| Future Asian Tigers | 2,3667                           | 51,6667                                    | 11,2804                   | 49,9000                 |
| Latin America       | 3,4286                           | 44,1429                                    | 38,8646                   | 61,6286                 |
| Eastern Europe      | 2,3750                           | 58,2500                                    | 7,5258                    | 36,7000                 |
| <b>Total</b>        | <b>2,8556</b>                    | <b>47,5556</b>                             | <b>21,0623</b>            | <b>53,9444</b>          |


Source: Filgueira (2007)

The data presented above shows that for all levels of human development, and with few exceptions Latin American countries tend to cluster together and distinctly separate from other regions and sub-regions of the developing world. The variables that create these specific clusters are also quite clear: ratio of income by deciles, fertility rates, age structure, dependency ratios and urbanization. In comparative terms the region presents: high inequality, high combined dependency ratios, high urban bias, relative high fertility rates. Though it has not been entered in the models, stylized data suggests four other features for Latin America: strong pattern of segmented (yet mutually related labor markets), marked gap and non convergence in fertility rates, smaller average household size and less presence of extended households (this last two features hold only in comparison to regions other than the ex-socialist bloc k).

### Average household size (estimate 2002)




Source: Authors' elaboration based World Bank Indicators, 2009



Source: World Health Organization. Estimates for Latin America based on six Latin American countries

Maybe, a stronger illustration of what we mean can be seen with only two variables (inequality and combined dependency) that in the most developed countries of Latin America cast them apart from the rest of their developmental peers. This, though not performed here, could probably be extended not to countries, but to the urban areas of most of Latin America.

## Inequality and dependency ratio in countries with high human development



No region in the world is reaching old age with the levels of inequality that some Latin American countries and regions within countries are. If we added as a third variable GDP per-capita we could go further. No region in the world has at the same time the relative low levels of GDP, high inequality and ageing of the population. This constitutes a major challenge and a learning experience that can and should be used to think about devices to confront what will inevitably come to a large part of the developing world.

The implications of the broader macro-constellation of socio-demographic development for the region can be summarized succinctly:

- Highly unequal exposure to structural risk and vulnerability
- High unequal access to the capacity to buy insurance against risks
- Shorter demographic window of opportunity
- High incidence of urban poverty
- Low capacity of social security systems to achieve universal coverage
- Strong structural bias towards the intergenerational reproduction of poverty
- Low capacity of families to operate as intergenerational solidarity arrangements

If this is the long term structural background that we have to confront the reality of Latin America has become even more complex given the present and future transformation it faces. Again in very schematic terms we can make a quick checklist of the most important trends in terms of family, markets and age structure.

### **Labor market transformations**

- Increased rates of activity, especially female
- Loss of public and industrial employment, increase in services
- Marked increase in unemployment
- Increasing labor instability
- Increased Informality
- These changes are not similar across population groups: it affected more negatively youth, women and the less skilled

Three functions of the labor market are hindered because of these changes: as a distributional mechanism, as a means to access security, as a status to access other social rights. Yet reforms in social policy assumed that the labor market would evolve rather in the opposite direction than it evolved. If labor markets and labor market evolution complicates things, family transformations and demographic change add challenges to family policy and social protection policies.

### **Family transformation**

- Increased divorce rates
- Increase in non-married couples
- Decrease in formal unions or marriages
- Reconstituted families increase (families by spouses and children from a divorced or separated previous family)
- Single (predominantly female) parenthood and single headed households increases
- Change in the sexual division of labor. Entry of women in the labor market.
- Increase in unipersonal households of elderly people increase
- Slight decrease of extended multigenerational households

### **Demographic (age and fertility) change**

- Lower fertility
- Divergent fertility rate drop by income and education both in quantity and calendar
- Higher life expectancy
- Shift towards dependency ratios led by ageing rather than fertility
- Increase in population over 60, 70, and 80
- Closing of demographic window of opportunity in 10 to 20 years in countries with more advanced demographic transitions.

**These family and demographic transformations imply that there is a:**

- Concentration of reproduction in poor sectors
- Increasing risk of intergenerational cycle of poverty
- Increased vulnerability of child and mother
- Increased dependency of women on a decreasingly efficient and inclusionary labor market
- Less family support in times of crisis
- Less adult time for children
- More demands of care coming from the intersection of persistent high and or early fertility in poorer sectors and increasing population reaching old age in those same sectors.

The reforms of the late 1980s and the 1990s assumed that markets and families could undertake much of the tasks of protection, insurance and access to welfare that previously was expected and attempted (not always accomplished) by the state. The idea was that there were more efficient institutions than the state to perform these tasks. Yet both the structural tensions of Latin American social development, as well as the recent trends in terms of markets, families and age and fertility structure, demonstrate that without state policies that factor in family change, fragility of family links to markets and brutal levels of inequality, expecting the shoulders of families –and especially women- to come to the rescue is nothing more than wishful thinking. A return to a State that builds its social protection assuming a stable bi-parental, patriarchal, male breadwinner family model in a desirable full formal employment market and in an assumed relatively young population is worse than wishful thinking. It is plain nonsense. Not all reforms of the nineties either neglected the state or attempted to roll back time. Some, though timid and insufficient went in the right direction. Others combine good intentions, average design and limited delivery. The closing section delves into these lights and shadows and into the possible advice that emerges from these rather inconsistent but nevertheless relevant efforts.


#### **4. Protection, Policies and Families: Gender and Generation**

Everybody agrees with the popular saying that time is money. This is because when we use time for productive endeavors we produce value. But not all the value that is produced through productive work has money attached to its exchange. In fact a very large part of what we as a society produce has absolutely no exchange value in terms of money, and thus has no price linked to it. All the work that people, mostly women, do at home cooking, cleaning and caring for others is done without a contract that establishes a price and the corresponding responsibilities that come with such a task. But monetized or not, work at home is productive work and does provide value for society at large and for the recipients of the fruits of that work. What is more important work done at home and in the care of others consumes time that cannot be used for other means either for care for oneself, leisure or paid work. Time is in this sense the ultimate scarce resource.

##### **1. The issue of women paid and unpaid work: the heart of the care crises**

Today women work as never before for wages. And women work as they always did, and maybe more than before for duty, love and/or food and shelter or out of fear and imposition. In other words they keep working for things other than money. This state of affairs is obviously unjust, but besides the fairness, it is unsustainable and it affects negatively the welfare of women and children and thus society at large.

### Latin America: Trends in participation rates by sex, 1990-2006



Source: ECLAC and ILO, on the basis of special tabulations of household surveys of the respective countries.

Furthermore it limits the capacity of states to sustain fiscally the social protection system since it limits the entry of women into the labor market. How do we reconcile paid work and unpaid work? How do we provide incentives rather than obstacles for women entry into the formal labor market? How do we redistribute the burden of unpaid work between men and women?

Let's remind the reader once more that these dilemmas are placed in the context of highly unequal societies. So it is especially the women of lower income groups and the children from these same sectors that most suffer the overburden of care and protection demands in the shoulders of women. Women and children from the other classes also suffer this state of affairs, but both through diminished fertility and through access to market solutions, they have other options. Poorer sector do not. If the state is unable to come up with regulations, goods and services that will breach the gap, equality, social inheritance and women and children welfare will suffer, and with them societies welfare at large.

Latin America has moved very slowly towards the recognition of the dilemmas and issues posed above, but the turn of the century showed some interest in these matters. The next more detailed section can help us view some of the most interesting dilemmas, possible course of action and actual innovations regarding these and closely related problems.


## 2. Reconciling work and family: possibilities and limits of labor market transformation

The labor market has a patriarchal genotype. It discriminates against women and does so in terms of wages, labor conditions, labor stability and unemployment. But in addition the labor market and specifically the organization of labor and the systems of carrots and stick present within labor markets are structurally biased against women. Not only do women carry the bulk of care in households, but the organization of labor clearly does not recognize this. Thus not only are women

confronting a double shift, but they are doing so in a context that assumes there is no double shift. Thus working schedules and time, career patterns and incentives, and social protection linked to labor market participation, assumes that care is being done by others.

This poses a major threat not just to women, but also to the welfare of all members that share those households. At present women wages represent between 90 and 60% of the average household wages in the region.

**Latin America and Caribbean, Women’s monthly income as a percentage of male earnings, 2005-2007**



Source, CEPAL 2008

If adequate conciliation policies from the state and strategies from the market do not appear, this state of affairs will become unsustainable, leading not just to the vulnerability of women but also to the deterioration of the aggregate welfare of societies and households at large. The loss is two pronged: care suffers and labor productivity suffers. Still, whatever is done at this level, it will not be enough. Conciliation policies that look at increasing the compatibility of the double shift shouldered by women assumes that the problem is simply one of organization and times of paid and unpaid labor, and not one of quantity. In order to actually reconcile care and paid labor the strategies have to include concrete forms that imply not just a conciliation of paid and unpaid work for women, but for society in general. In other words the care crises cannot be solved without redistributing the burden of care. This can take place within households but can also take place through fiscal and social policy. In both cases the state, more in the latter than in the former, can and should undertake concrete policies.

**3. Incentives and state support for a new distribution of care burdens within the family**

If labor markets have a patriarchal genotype, families is where patriarchy is sustained and reproduced. In particular within the household a particular division of labor, power and statuses takes place. In Latin America this distribution of labor presents a classic pattern regarding unpaid


labor and a rather modern structure regarding paid labor. As we have shown above women no have participation rates that are close to 50% while men have slightly lowered their participation rates to something below 80%. Thus the women/men ratio of economic participation is far more than half. On the other hand if average income participation is considered, where women work for wages, the relationship hovers between sixty and ninety percent. If we look at the typical active ages of women then the percentage in terms of participation rates goes in all cases beyond 60%.

**Female Participation rates by age and country, around 2006**

| Country            | AGE GROUP |         |         |         |             |
|--------------------|-----------|---------|---------|---------|-------------|
|                    | 15 – 24   | 25 – 34 | 35 - 44 | 45 – 59 | 60 and over |
| Argentina          | 38.4      | 67.0    | 69.9    | 61.8    | 18.0        |
| Bolivia            | 41.1      | 68.1    | 76.0    | 71.1    | 39.6        |
| Brazil             | 56.7      | 72.9    | 72.6    | 56.2    | 16.2        |
| Chile              | 30.6      | 64.2    | 61.8    | 54.8    | 16.4        |
| Colombia           | 46.2      | 74.7    | 73.3    | 57.2    | 16.7        |
| Costa Rica         | 39.5      | 66.2    | 65.3    | 49.7    | 11.7        |
| Ecuador            | 45.0      | 68.4    | 68.5    | 62.9    | 34.6        |
| El Salvador        | 36.1      | 67.0    | 70.5    | 56.6    | 22.3        |
| Guatemala          | 41.5      | 62.0    | 60.8    | 59.0    | 27.6        |
| Honduras           | 37.1      | 62.2    | 65.2    | 54.0    | 23.9        |
| Mexico             | 40.1      | 62.9    | 65.2    | 56.8    | 21.5        |
| Nicaragua          | 36.1      | 63.9    | 71.0    | 60.5    | 24.0        |
| Panama             | 37.2      | 67.1    | 68.1    | 58.0    | 11.8        |
| Paraguay           | 49.8      | 71.8    | 74.3    | 63.4    | 31.3        |
| Peru               | 47.3      | 65.4    | 71.0    | 58.9    | 26.0        |
| Dominican Republic | 45.7      | 73.0    | 73.1    | 54.0    | 14.7        |
| Uruguay            | 45.8      | 76.1    | 77.3    | 67.5    | 12.8        |
| Venezuela          | 33.1      | 64.5    | 69.9    | 58.8    | 20.4        |

Source: ECLAC. Statistical yearbook for Latin America and the Caribbean, 2007

Average Daily Hours used in activities related to household chores by sex and age groups



Source: ECLAC, on the basis of special tabulations of household surveys of the respective countries.

This reality stands in stark contrast with the average weekly hours dedicated to unpaid work. While no data is presented here for Argentina and Uruguay similar studies show a pattern that mirrors the ones that the previous graph shows.

Meanwhile, labor markets and status operate under the assumption that it is the women who do not work for pay the one that works at home. Furthermore, these same states and labor markets assume that it is the sole function of males the role of money provider. Given these completely false assumptions, neither markets nor states will move forward and incorporate the blatant new realities that we have documented above. There are some shy initiatives regarding parental leaves and more flexible hours, as well as some isolated initiatives to incorporate child care facilities at work, but they are minimal compared to the size of the problem.

**Cash transfers and family: Is there room for a new inter-generational contract? Is this new contract gender sensitive?**

As population ages the issue of generational orientation of social spending becomes a salient one. Social security with pensions and health care costs leading the way, can assume a magnitude that neglects spending in services geared at the reproductive side of society: women and children. How to provide basic cash transfers to the elderly population that can no longer get work or work, and how at the same time developing countries continue to achieve higher participation rates of females and invest in human capital for its offspring becomes a critical equation.

Privatizing social security will not help if we care for the elderly. Most will be left out. A purely contributory pay as you go system will not be sustainable. Countries in Latin America went both ways before trying to find some middle ground. Flat rate targeted or universal non contributory systems of basic pensions have become part of the legitimate agenda of the new century. Chile, Uruguay, Bolivia, Brazil and Argentina at the provincial and national level, as well as Mexico (the Federal District) are coming to terms with the idea that a basic guarantee for old age can be both fiscally prudent and socially desirable, if at the same time subsidies for the better off pensioners are suppressed or limited. Latin America does not belong in its family genotype to the Asian societies that hold care for the elderly within the family as a still relatively sacred principle. While families –especially extended households- did in the past and still do in the present provide care and shelter for their elderly this is increasingly rare, especially among the middle and lower middle classes. This is especially problematic in the case of women, who live longer and many times do not have access to pension systems because of their informal and fragmented labor history.

The other part of the intergenerational pact concerns how much money society is willing to pay to support the role of families, and especially women in providing care, human capital and protection to children. Again, the Latin American state has assumed in the past that such payment came in the form of family wages for males that in turn would go to the household for reproductive purposes. Reality has proven less amicable. Men are no longer, if they ever were, able or willing to sustain this contract (a gender and generational contract that bounds them to women and children) to the extent required for this model to work. Women, as a matter of fact, more and more are both the main caretaker and the main wage provider of the household. If a gender contract has been broken (and with it a generational contract), should we then not collectivize it?

In highly unequal societies, with fiscal limitations, where should we start? Conditional cash transfers and reformed systems of family allowances have become relevant instruments of redistribution, and have increasingly become a relevant device in the overall system of social protection. In Latin America, governments in the nineties initiate cash transfer programs directed towards the poor. (Honduras: PRAF II in 1990; México: PROGRESA in 1997 and Oportunidades since 2001, Brazil: PETI in 1998, Bolsa Alimentación in 2000 and Bolsa Escolar in 2001; Ecuador:

Bono Solidario in 1998 and Bono de Desarrollo Humano beginning from 2003; Nicaragua: Red de Protección Social in 2000; Colombia: Familias en Acción en 2001) (Serrano, 2005: 72-73). The majority of these cash transfer programs are conditioned transfers: families commit to children's attendance in school and agree for mothers to receive medical check-ups. These funds or programs combine the cash nature of traditional social security transfers, the targeted and conditional nature of liberal inspired systems and the multisectoral emphasis of integrated social programs. As accepted tools in the repertoire of social policies in the region, recent governments have reassumed, extended, or launched cash transfer programs directed towards the poor. In many instances, these programs have increased the amount of assistance, providing more benefits and extending coverage. In Brazil, the Lula government pushed for the *Hambre Cero* (Zero Hunger) and *Bolsa Familia* programs, which in 2005 covered more than seven million families. In efforts to combat extreme poverty in Chile, the Chile Solidario program combined cash transfers with promotional components, psychosocial support, and personalized attention, and extending coverage to 250,000 families (Serrano, 2005:51-52). Ecuador saw the government of Rafael Correa double the amount of the Bono de Desarrollo Humano (Human Development Bond) from \$15 to \$30 per month, increase coverage to include the disabled, and double the Bono de Vivienda (Housing Bond) from \$1,800 to \$3,600 (Ramírez y Minteguiaga, 2007: 98). In Nicaragua under Daniel Ortega, the government implemented the "Hambre Cero" program (Zero Hunger Program), under which livestock animals were distributed to the central female members of poor households.

In Uruguay, a program called PANES (National Plan for Attention to Social Emergency) was established and put into effect in 2005 by President Tabare Vazquez in order to address pressing issues not necessarily associated with unemployment. In addition to the Citizen Income Program (providing monthly transfers of \$56 to eligible families), PANES included other aspects, including temporary employment (Work for Uruguay), nutrition, emergency health, education in a critical context, and housing for the homeless (Svalestuen, 2007). Moreover, PANES adopted a discourse of the right to inclusion, and was a temporary program, to be replaced in 2007 by the Plan de Equidad (Equity Plan). The Equity Plan (Plan de Equidad), launched in September 2007 by the Uruguayan government, appears to be the most articulated policy on universal social rights. It has replaced PANES, yet it combines the assistentialist and short-term elements of the latter with an intent to reconstruct and modernize the social state. Proposals for reforms in the health and education systems are especially noteworthy, and together with tax reforms and extended pension coverage they seek to create a network of basic services and social protection for all citizens, available from infancy to death. The Equity Plan includes measures that can yield a considerable impact on the reduction of inequalities, chief among them a system of non-contributory social assistance that would encompass ninety five percent of families living below the poverty line, substantial expansion of early childhood education, the extension of retirement benefits, and a series of actions to improve the quality of education at all levels. The design of the plan aims toward a social democratic strategy of basic universalism and gradual extension of non-contributory social

assistance (Andrenacci y Repetto, 2006; Filgueira et al., 2005).

In Chile, since the Lagos period (2000-2006), the discourse of rights has been effectively incorporated into the design of social programs. In the area of health, the AUGE system (Universal Access with Explicit Guarantees) was established to determine illnesses and pathologies to be treated universally, along with rights pursuable in court (Serrano, 2005: 38; Waissbluth, 2006: 42-46). Subsequently, the Bachelet government instituted the Chile Crece Contigo program (Chile Grows with You), a comprehensive child protection system that covers the period from pregnancy up to four years of age. The system is universal in scope and targets assistance to the forty percent of the population that is most vulnerable. The view is that by achieving greater equity in this crucial phase of the life course one can aspire to greater equality of capacities for future development in the educational system and labor market.

Finally, it is important to highlight the relative significance of these programs in the fiscal structure of the Latin American social states. Beyond the fact that these programs have captured the greater part of general, technical, and academic attention, they represent no more than 1 or 2 percent of GDP, and in general do not constitute more than 10 percent of total social expenditures in Latin American countries (CEPAL, 2005). More recently, less attention has been paid to the transformations in education, health, and social security, the central pillars of social policy.

### **Services and families: Collective strategies for redistributing the burden of care**

In addition to a system of cash transfers that is being rethought a still underdeveloped and undernourished agenda on social services, especially education for children aged 0 to 5 and extended time in primary and secondary schools has assumed at least some space on the stage and in some countries such as Chile (extended time) and Perú, Uruguay, Costa Rica and the countries from the Caribbean (preschool) have made important inroads, but there is still a long way to go if early schooling and preschool wants to become a central piece in the redistribution of gender and generational welfare and burdens.


### Coverage in early childhood education in selected countries

| Country                       | Early childhood education (%) |           |                |           |
|-------------------------------|-------------------------------|-----------|----------------|-----------|
|                               | 0-2 years                     | 3 years   | 4 years        | 5 years   |
| Argentina (2004)              | 0                             | 0         | 28,8           | 57,3      |
| Brazil (2002/03)              | 0                             | 4,8       | 26,1           | 54,3      |
| Bolivia (2002/03)             | 0                             | 0,6       | 18,8           | 60,9      |
| Colombia                      | 0                             | 13,8      | 28,3           | 58,3      |
| Costa Rica (2005?)            | 0                             | 3,1       | 32,4           | 77,8      |
| Cuba (2003/04)                | 11                            | 99,1      | 99,7           | 100       |
| Ecuador (2002/03)             | 0                             | 0         | 11,9           | n/a       |
| Guatemala                     | 0                             | 6,5       | 11,3           | 34,3      |
| Haiti (2002/03)<br>girls/boys | 1,5                           | 13,4/13,9 | 20,9/21,4      | 26,1/25,3 |
| Jamaica (2003/04?)            | 0                             | 60,4      | 95,9           | 98,5      |
| Nicaragua (2004?)             | 12,2 (PAININ)                 | 21,3      | 40             | 58,7      |
| Panamá (2002/03)              | 0                             | 3,8       | 26,2           | 78,1      |
| Paraguay (2002/03)            | 0                             | 2         | 18             | 83        |
| Peru (2002/03)                | 0                             | 39,7      | 60,3           | 73,7      |
| St. Lucia (2004/05)           | 9,4                           | 70,3      | 67,2 (20,3 EP) | 8,7       |
| Uruguay (2002/03)             | 0,9                           | 8,5       | 39,7           | 87,4      |

Source: ILO-UNDP based on UNESCO data: Informe de Seguimiento de la EPT en el Mundo 2007. Bases sólidas: atención y educación de la primera infancia. 2006.

If on the one hand services for the youngest have to be considered, on the other as societies age, services of care for the elderly become of paramount importance. The proportion of population 75 and older, where care becomes critical has already become relevant in the southern cone and in the urban centers of Latin America in general, and will become more and more so in the next 10 to 30 years.

### Latin America and Caribbean: Forecast of population 60 years and over, 2010, 2030 and 2050 in percentage



Source: CELADE, 2007


The state provides little if any services for this part of the population leading to a stratified response along class lines: family or nothing for the poor and middle classes and family and markets for the better off.

### The issue of new forms of families: between denial and grudging recognition

While not one of possible responses listed above the issue of what is a family and what forms of family deserve social protection and legal recognition is a critical issue when we ask ourselves about the economy of care. Household aggregation of resources and risk pooling is the primal form through which social groups protect themselves against risks, decay and through which they provide support for dependent members. A society where unipersonal households dominate has not yet emerged. But the less aggregated into households adults are, the more care becomes privatized and/or costly for the system of social protection. Thus, favoring the permanence of cooperative arrangements between adults in households is the smart way to go. Now this does not imply that the smart way to go is to favor a particular arrangement (say married couples where men work for wages and women in the household). Non married couples, gay couples, second unions and multigenerational non-married arrangements should all be part of the strategy of strengthening the capacities of families to provide care and support for its members. If these forms of family are not legally recognized then they will be less stable. Those concerned with the notion that opening up these legal recognitions would induce “traditional family” breakdown should simply take a look at the data.

America Latina (18 países): Hogares Urbanos con jefatura femenina, 1990-2006/2007  
(Porcentaje de hogares)

**Latin America (18 countries): Urban Households headed by women, 1990-2006/2007  
(Percent of households)**



Source: ECLAC, 2008

### Percentage of non-marital births, around 1970 and 2000

|             | YEAR | %    | YEAR | %    |
|-------------|------|------|------|------|
| Argentina   | 1980 | 29,8 | 2000 | 57,6 |
| Chile       | 1970 | 18,8 | 2001 | 50,5 |
| Costa Rica  | 1970 | 29,4 | 2003 | 57,5 |
| El Salvador | 1970 | 67,8 | 1998 | 72,8 |
| Mexico      | 1970 | 27,3 | 2001 | 39,6 |
| Panamá      | 1970 | 70,9 | 2002 | 79,9 |
| Paraguay    | 1970 | 42,6 | 2002 | 51,0 |
| Uruguay     | 1970 | 21,1 | 2001 | 55,2 |

Source: Castro Martín, Teresa et al. (2008) *Matrimonio vs. Unión consensual en Latinoamérica: contraste desde una perspectiva de género*. III Congreso de la Asociación Latinoamericana de Población, ALAP. On the basis of: United Nations Demographic Yearbook & World Fertility Report, and National Institutions of statistical.

### Percentage of Population separated or divorced

| Country     | % of separated and divorced |            |
|-------------|-----------------------------|------------|
|             | circa 1994                  | circa 2005 |
| Argentina   | 7,1                         | 10,7       |
| Bolivia     | 9,4                         | 9,4        |
| Chile       | 7,7                         | 9,4        |
| Colombia    | 13,8                        | 17,8       |
| Costa Rica  | 13,3                        | 16,9       |
| Ecuador     | --                          | 11,2       |
| El Salvador | --                          | 25,2       |
| Guatemala   | --                          | 8,4        |
| Honduras    | 20,6                        | 6,7        |
| México      | --                          | 10,7       |
| Nicaragua   | 23,0                        | --         |
| Panamá      | --                          | 20,7       |
| Paraguay    | 3,7                         | 6,5        |
| Perú        | --                          | 13,1       |
| Uruguay     | 10,2                        | 14,7       |
| Venezuela   | 6,8                         | 13,3       |

Source: ECLAC, 2009

It is happening anyway. And the reason is not legislation permissive of the new forms (largely lacking in the region). The reason is the inadequacy of patriarchal arrangements in markets, states and the so called “traditional families” to foster and sustain cooperative arrangements between men and women in those families. Thus, and once again, logic indicates that recognizing new family

forms and providing a better environment and a better and more balanced division of labor within families between men and women would be measured that complement each other in increasing something that is no doubt desirable: persistence of cooperative household arrangements between two or more adults that care for each other and their dependents (be these the children or the elderly).

### **In closing**

The issue of care, use of time and unpaid work has entered with full force into the academic and policy making agenda in most OECD countries. It has done so to a lesser extent in emerging and developing countries. Yet the case of Latin America constitutes a natural candidate to enter into this debate, as do other countries with similar challenges. These challenges can be summed up in very simple terms: family transformation -mirroring though with inequality specificities what has been called the second demographic transition-, ageing of the population (especially in the more advanced countries of the region), women's full entry into the labor force, high levels of inequality and labor market deterioration.

When the topic of care is brought to the forefront and the political economy of care is discussed three very salient, related and many times neglected cleavages become integrated into a very productive analytical framework: gender, generation and class inequalities and their interactions can be seen more clearly than when they are considered in isolation. Also disciplines meet in a productive manner: economics, sociology, demography and even political science come naturally into play when trying to unravel the complex systems of causes and conditions that create, recreate or eventually erode a given arrangement, a certain explicit or implicit contract between classes, genders and generations.

This increasingly mainstream field of study is not homogeneous regarding methods, theoretical backgrounds and of course normative emphasis. For some it is a perspective spawn from the womb of gender studies and thus looks essentially at issues of gender equality, women's emancipation and approaches those normative preferences in the mist of feminist debates. Reconciling work and family and redistributing the burden of care within the household and between families, states and markets are thus the central issues.

Gender inequality has been a structural feature of our welfare model, but a stable feature with relatively clear effects. Today the reality has changed and new effects that increase vulnerability of women and especially of lower income women and the future elderly women appear as its major consequences. A decoupling of a persistent system of domination with a decaying system of protection that accompanied that form of gender domination leaves women with a larger burden of paid and unpaid work and less protection in either sphere.

Another normative preference that is less dominant in gender studies but has become central in

welfare studies that many times do not coincide fully with feminist perspectives does not place so much attention on gender inequality, patriarchal structures and women emancipation, and rather shifts its focus to child well being. Of course all perspectives do care usually about both women's welfare and children's welfare, but the emphases are quite different. The issue of generational balance of welfare, children's opportunities and social inheritance and child poverty are central to the issue of care, education and family. Esping-Andersen's (1999, 2002) recent work has been focused mostly on this topic and looking at care arrangements and the political economy of care as optimal or suboptimal solutions to the issue of child welfare, inequality of opportunity and poverty. In many Latin American countries a stratified contributory welfare state that in a relatively resource-poor and fiscally constrained country has to face the double challenge of an ageing population – which diverts money from needed cash transfers, educational and care services for children and families with children- and a changed family and labor market –that puts increasing strains on families and women to juggle work, family and care. Moving towards a friendlier and at the same time sustainable welfare mix of family, markets and state is proving to be a tough job.

Finally, and beyond the issues of social protection, there is there is the issue of family and family protection. In order for Latin American societies to successfully confront the perfect storm of care and protection that is rising in the region, families are central. But not the traditional patriarchal families where males work for wages and women work in the household, not the stable life ranging arrangements that are idealized in this perspective. We need a legal and policy framework that looks at families as they really are, and not as some would like them to be. Nay more, the way some would like them to be proved even when conditions were closer to the template, that women in such arrangements lacked power, autonomy and rights. The demise of the traditional patriarchal family is not something to mourn, but something to celebrate. It depends on the capacity of societies and states to embrace new forms of families that can become allies, rather than enemies in the struggle for social protection, gender equality and intergenerational solidarity.

## **REFERENCES:**

- Aguirre, Rosario (2005) *Uso del Tiempo y Trabajo no remunerado*. UNIFEM/Universidad de la República. Montevideo.
- Batthyány, K.; Cabrera, M.; Scuro, L. (2007a) “Encuesta Nacional de Hogares Ampliada 2006: Perspectiva de Género”, Informe Temático, Instituto Nacional de Estadística, Programa de las Naciones Unidas para el Desarrollo (PNUD) y el Fondo de Población de las Naciones Unidas (UNFPA). Montevideo, Mayo.
- Batthyány; K. (2004) *Cuidado infantil y trabajo: ¿un desafío exclusivamente femenino?; una mirada desde el género y la ciudadanía social*. Montevideo: CINTERFOR/OIT.
- Esping-Andersen, Gøsta, Duncan Gallie, Anton Hemerijck, and John Myles. 2002. *Why We Need a New Welfare State*. New York: Oxford.
- Esping-Andersen, Gøsta. 1990. *The Three Worlds of Welfare Capitalism*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- Esping-Andersen, Gøsta. 1999. *Social Foundations of Postindustrial Economies*. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Filgueira, Carlos (1996) *Sobre revoluciones Ocultas: las transformaciones de la familia en el Uruguay*. CEPAL,

Montevideo.

Filgueira, C. and Peri, A (2004) América Latina. Los rostros de la pobreza y sus causas determinantes. Serie Población y Desarrollo. CEPAL, Santiago de Chile.

Filgueira, Fernando (1998): "El nuevo modelo de prestaciones sociales en América Latina: residualismo, eficiencia y ciudadanía estratificada" en Brian Roberts (ed.) Ciudadanía y Política Sociales, FLACSO/SSRC: San José de Costa Rica

Filgueira, F. y Filgueira, C. (2002): "Models of Welfare and Models of Capitalism: the limits of transferability" en Evelyne Huber (ed.); Welfare Regimes and State Reform in Developing Countries"; Penn University Press,

Filgueira, C., Filgueira F. & Fuentes, A. Critical Choices at a Critical Age: Youth Emancipation Paths and School Attainment in Latin America. IADB, Working Paper, R-432, Washington DC.

Martinez, Juliana (2008) Domesticar la Incertidumbre en América Latina. Mercado laboral, Política Social y Familias. Editorial UCR, San José de Costa Rica

Filgueira, Fernando, Federico Rodríguez, Claudia Rafaniello, Sergio Lijtenstein y Pablo Alegre (2005) "Estructura de riesgo y arquitectura de protección social en el Uruguay actual. Crónica de un divorcio anunciado" in Filgueira and Gelber (eds.) Thematic Number of PRISMA review #21, 2005, Dilemas sociales y alternativas distributivas en el Uruguay. Montevideo.

Filgueira, Fernando and Gelber, Denisse (2005): La informalidad en Uruguay: ¿Un mecanismo de adaptación del trabajo o del capital?, Montevideo: IPES, Documento de trabajo, serie Monitor social del Uruguay, nº 5 .

Filgueira, F. y Papadópulos, J. (1997): "Putting conservatism to good use? Neoliberal Transformations in Uruguay" en Douglas A. Chalmers, Carlos M. Vilas, Katherine Hite, Scott B. Martin, Kerianne Piester y Monique Segarra (eds.); The New Politics of Inequality in Latin America. Rethinking Representation in Latin America, Oxford University Press; Oxford.

Folbre, N. (2006) "Beyond de Market: Accounting for Care". International Association for Feminist Economics (IAFFE). Australia, July 7-9.

Huber, Evelyne and John D. Stephens. 2002. Development and Crisis of the Welfare State: Parties and Policies in Global Markets. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Selections.

Huber, Evelyne and Stephens, John D. 2004 Combatting Old and New Social Risks, Paper prepared for delivery at the 14th International Conference of Europeanists, Palmer

Kaztman, Rúben y Filgueira, Fernando (2001), Panorama de la Infancia y de la Familia en Uruguay, IPES, UCUDAL. Migdal, Joel S. 2001. State in Society: Studying How States and Societies Transform and Constitute One Another. New York: Cambridge University Press, pp. 3-38, 231-264.

Mitchell, Timothy. 1991. "The Limits of the State: Beyond Statist Approaches and Their Critics." American Political Science Review 85, no. 1: 77-96.

Offe, Claus. 1984. "Theses on the theory of the state." Pp. 119-129 in Contradictions of the Welfare State, ed. John Keane. Cambridge: MIT Press.

Orloff, Ann Shola. 1993. "Gender and the Social Rights of Citizenship: The Comparative Analysis of Gender Relations and Welfare States." American Sociological Review 58, no. 3: 303-328.

Pascale, Gillian (2006) "Male Breadwinner Model" entry for the Internacional Encyclopedia of Social Policy. Routledge, New York.

Pautassi, L.; Faur, E.; Gherardi, N. (2005) "Legislación laboral y género en América Latina. Avances y omisiones". En:

Políticas hacia las familias, protección e inclusión sociales. Santiago de Chile: CEPAL. (Seminarios y conferencias N° 46) pág. 111-130.

Pierson, Paul. 1996. "The New Politics of the Welfare State." *World Politics* 48, no. 2: 143-179.

Pierson, Paul. 2001. *The New Politics of the Welfare State*. Oxford University

Press, pp. 3-19, 56-85.

Przeworski, Adam (2003): *States and Markets. A Primer in Political Economy*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Pugliese, L. (2007) "Análisis comparado de una selección de programas de protección a los adultos mayores en Argentina, Brasil, Chile y Uruguay. Segunda parte: Programas Sociales". Banco de Previsión Social, Asesoría General en Seguridad Social, *Comentarios de Seguridad Social - N°16*, Julio – Setiembre, pp.137-151.