

A FRAMEWORK FOR FAMILY-SENSITIVE SOCIAL PROTECTION



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CONTENTS

DOHA INTERNATIONAL FAMILY INSTITUTE (DIFI)	7
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS	7
INTRODUCTION	9
CHAPTER ONE: METHODOLOGY	11
CHAPTER TWO: SOCIAL PROTECTION DEFINITIONS: WIDE-RANGING BENEFITS AND OBJECTIVES	12
CHAPTER THREE: WHY FOCUS ON FAMILY-SENSITIVE SOCIAL PROTECTION?	17
3.1. Fertility and Life Expectancy: The Demographic Transition	17
3.2. Weakening Family Ties and Stability: Marriage and Divorce	25
CHAPTER FOUR: FAMILY-SENSITIVE SOCIAL PROTECTION: DEFINING FAMILY	30
CHAPTER FIVE: FAMILY-SENSITIVE SOCIAL PROTECTION: IMPACT ANALYSIS	34
CHAPTER SIX: RESEARCH, NORMATIVE AND CONCEPTUAL ISSUES	41
6.1. Challenges: Conflicting Objectives and Unanticipated Consequences	43
CHAPTER SEVEN: BASIC TENETS OF FAMILY-SENSITIVE SOCIAL PROTECTION (FSSP)	45
7.1. Formation of Stable Families	45
7.2. Procreation	45
7.3. Socialization of the Young	47
7.4. Care for Dependent Members	47

7.5. Mutual Aid and Companionship	47
7.6. Empirical Analysis	48
CHAPTER EIGHT: POLICY IMPLICATIONS: AUTHORIZING FAMILY IMPACT REPORTS	49
APPENDIX A: ATTITUDES TOWARD INCREASING EQUALITY IN THE GENDER DIVISION OF LABOR IN FAMILY LIFE, BY WELFARE REGIMES, GENERATIONS AND GENDER 1910-2000	50
APPENDIX B: ASIA	52
APPENDIX C: PARTICIPANTS IN THE FSSP CONSULTATION MEETING IN DOHA, JUNE 26-27, 2018	53
APPENDIX D: AGENDA, FAMILY-SENSITIVE SOCIAL PROTECTION PROJECT EXPERT MEETING, JUNE 26-27, 2018	54
APPENDIX E: SOCIAL PROTECTION WORLDWIDE: PERCENT OF GDP, BY COUNTRY	57
REFERENCES	62

DOHA INTERNATIONAL FAMILY INSTITUTE

The Doha International Family Institute (DIFI), a member of Qatar Foundation for Education, Science and Community Development (QF), was established in 2006. The Institute works to strengthen the family through the development and dissemination of high-quality research on Arab families, encouraging knowledge exchange on issues relevant to the family and making the family a priority for policy makers through advocacy and outreach at the national, regional and international levels. Among the Institute's most important initiatives are the Annual Conference on the Family and the OSRA Research Grant in collaboration with the Qatar National Research Fund, an annual research grant which encourages research related to the Arab family and family policy. The Institute has special consultative status with the United Nations Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC).

To know more about the Doha International Family Institute, please visit www.difi.org.qa.

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INTRODUCTION

The family is an institution that serves the essential social functions of procreation, socialization, nurturing of the young, social-emotional gratification, and care for dependent members; it is the primary seedbed for the transmission of human values and a vital source of social cohesion; moreover, it plays the important role of mutual support mediating between the individual and the state. Indeed, family is often referred to as the basic building block of society.

Since the mid-20th century, social, economic, and technological developments have disrupted the established patterns of family life in many regions throughout the world. Drawing attention to these changes, this report makes a case for adding a conceptual lens to analyses of social protection that focuses on the ways social welfare provisions may impact family life. In formulating the rationale for what shall be defined as “Family-Sensitive Social Protection (FSSP),” the case begins with an overview of the definitions and objectives of social protection. Next, a range of data on the changing patterns of family life are analyzed, which draw our attention to how these changes have eroded this institution’s capacity to perform some of its essential functions in modern times. This analysis is followed by the articulation of a conceptual framework for FSSP that defines this approach and distinguishes it from other conceptual approaches to social protection, identifying the alternative perspective that it adds to mainstream analyses of social protection. To be clear, the objective of FSSP is not to offer an alternative to the conventional policies for social protection, but to provide an alternative lens for assessing the consequences of these policies. After reviewing the conceptual framework, the challenges and practices associated with FSSP will be discussed along with issues raised for further consideration. Finally, we summarize the basic tenets of FSSP and consider the policy-related implications of this alternative perspective on social protection.

In addressing these topics it is recognized that the rates of change on features of family life, the perception of the optimal type and level of involvement of a state with regard to supporting families, and the degree of public expenditure on social protection, differ among countries. For instance, fertility and divorce rates vary; some countries have highly developed welfare states that provide many social benefits to individuals and families; others spend a relatively small proportion of their GDP on social protection. To develop a common rationale for and conceptual definition of Family-Sensitive Social Protection requires formulating generalizations that are broadly applicable to many geographic regions. To that end, the report will refer to developments in major regions around the globe (including North America, Europe, Latin America, East Asia, and the Middle East and North Africa), recognizing that while empirically justified these generalizations do not necessarily apply to every one of the 195 countries in the world.

In examining data on geographic regions, however, it is important to recognize that there is considerable diversity among specific countries within these different regions; for example, just as there are large dissimilarities between the socioeconomic conditions of Norway and Lithuania, the MENA region includes extremely wealthy and extremely poor countries; here, even among the wealthiest countries there is consid-

erable variation in family demographics such as divorce rates (see Figure 1). Thus, while the analytic lens of Family-Sensitive Social Protection is designed to examine social provisions in different regions and countries within those regions, the implications for social policy may vary depending upon the specific sociocultural and economic conditions in each country.



Figure 1. Divorce Rates per 1,000, ages 15+, Citizens of Select Gulf States 2010-2015

Recognizing that social protection policies operate in diverse sociocultural and economic contexts, this study seeks to expand conventional perspectives on the design and evaluation of these welfare-related measures, which benefit individuals and tend to be concerned with significant issues such as poverty, gender equality, and child development. The goal of this study is to highlight an additional perspective, which emphasizes the impact of social protection on family stability and cohesion over the life course. The justifications for this objective stem not only from the importance of strong family bonds as the institutional foundation for human development, but also from the changing character of family life in modern times, which threatens to weaken those bonds and undermine the capacity to perform the essential functions of this social unit. As Bogenschneider and Corbett (2010) observe, the family unit promotes healthy child development and makes a fundamental contribution to rearing committed citizens and productive workers.

CHAPTER ONE: METHODOLOGY

The research for this report involved a wide-ranging review of the literature on the changing social and demographic characteristics of family life and focused perspectives on social protection. In addition to a review of scholarly publications, data were drawn from reports of major international organizations and surveys, including but not limited to the World Bank, International Labour Organization (ILO), United Nations Economic and Social Commission for Western Asia (ESCWA), International Social Security Association, European Social Survey, Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), Social Trends Institute, United Nations (UN), Pew Research Center, and Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC).

The crafting of this report involved a two-stage review process. In the first stage, a preliminary draft was reviewed by the project team of the Doha International Family Institute (DIFI) and ESCWA. After revisions were made based on the feedback from this review, a final draft of the report was submitted for the second-stage review, which involved a two-day expert group meeting in Doha. In preparation for this meeting a group of international experts on social protection and family development (see Appendix C for the list) submitted written comments on the report. These comments formed the starting point for a lively, wide-ranging intellectual exchange over the two days of the expert meeting, which covered topics dealing with guaranteed income (both conditional and unconditional), cash grants and family life, means-tested social benefits and the formation of stable families, cash versus in-kind social benefits, marriage benefits to encourage family life, work-oriented benefits and family life, and social protection and alternative family structures (see Appendix D for the agenda). The discussion of these topics (later summarized in a detailed report of proceedings, which can be downloaded at www.difi.org.qa) gave rise to a number of issues including:

- alternative definitions of family and the meaning of family stability;
- various forms and degrees of social protection in different countries;
- implications of diverse socioeconomic, cultural and religious traditions;
- unanticipated family-related consequences of social policies;
- the need for a life-course perspective;
- family trends in different regions;
- the effects of markets on family relationships;
- recognition of informal measures of social protection, and
- the value of alternative perspectives on social protection that address gender equality, poverty, social inclusion, child welfare, and work.

The final revision of this report has benefited from the clarifying observations, relevant insights and constructive commentary gleaned from the second-stage expert review.

CHAPTER TWO: SOCIAL PROTECTION DEFINITIONS: WIDE-RANGING BENEFITS AND OBJECTIVES

The definition, practice and aims of social protection have been described and analyzed from a number of perspectives. Examining cash transfer programs in Latin America and Sub-Saharan Africa as instruments of social protection, Scarlato and d’Agostino (2016) define social protection as **“a collection of programs addressing risk, vulnerability, inequality and poverty through a system of transfers in cash or in kind.”**

The UN Social Protection Floor (SPF) focuses on **“the provision of essential services and transfers for all individuals in need of protection”** (Bertranou, 2010). It is an individual-social-rights-based approach to the provision of a wide array of income and in-kind benefits. Specifically, **“an SPF seeks to guarantee access to nationally defined baskets of essential goods, services, and income transfers that ensure that people are not hungry, do not suffer from treatable illnesses, do not remain uneducated, do not have to resort to unsafe water, and do not remain homeless, in an effort to prevent them from falling into extreme poverty or help them out of poverty”** (Cichon, Behrendt, & Wodsak, 2011).

The ILO defines social protection as **“the set of public measures that a society provides for its members to protect them against economic and social distress that would be caused by the absence or a substantial reduction of income from work as a result of various contingencies (sickness, maternity, employment injury, unemployment, invalidity, old age, and death of the breadwinner); the provision of healthcare; and the provision of benefits for families with children”** (García & Gruat, 2003). Analyzing the evolution of social protection, García and Gruat propose that the ILO concept be broadened to include three key objectives: 1) an assurance of minimum well-being through a guarantee of essential goods and services that provide protection against life contingencies for all people; 2) the promotion of individual and social potentials and opportunities; and 3) the advancement of proactive social policies to protect against risks.

According to the ILO’s Social Protection Floors Recommendation No. 202 of 2012, social protection floors are **“nationally defined sets of basic social security guarantees which secure protection aimed at preventing or alleviating poverty, vulnerability and social exclusion,”** including at least the following:

- (a) access to a nationally defined set of goods and services, constituting essential healthcare, including maternity care, that meets the criteria of availability, accessibility, acceptability and quality;
- (b) basic income security for children, at least at a nationally defined minimum level, providing access to nutrition, education, care and any other necessary goods and services;
- (c) basic income security, at least at a nationally defined minimum level, for persons in active age who are unable to earn sufficient income, in particular in cases of sickness, unemployment, maternity and disability; and
- (d) basic income security, at least at a nationally defined minimum level, for older persons. (ILO, 2012)

A range of social protection benefits ensuring minimum standards of protection may include child and family benefits, maternity benefits, sickness and healthcare benefits, disability and work injury benefits, pension and survivors' benefits, unemployment benefits, employment guarantees, and other benefits in cash and in kind provided through multiple channels such as universal benefit schemes, social insurance schemes, social assistance schemes, negative income tax schemes, public employment schemes, and employment support schemes. Social protection programs must also ensure that they meet the demands of people with special needs.

Furthermore, as per ILO Recommendation 202, social protection benefits should be complemented and coordinated with a broader range of employment, active labor-market and other policies that **“enhance formal employment, income generation, education, literacy, vocational training, skills and employability, that reduce precariousness, and that promote secure work, entrepreneurship and sustainable enterprises within a decent work framework.”**

In 2015 the ILO published a policy paper analyzing cash and in-kind social protection for children and their families in 183 countries, focusing on income security; the child and family benefits included a variety of cash transfer programs such as social assistance, children's allowances and conditional cash transfers. This definition of income security also included an array of in-kind provisions related to nutrition, care, education, and healthcare. These benefits are seen to **“reduce families' spending needs and can facilitate parents' availability to engage in paid employment knowing their children are well cared for”** (p. 3). The ILO report notes that **“obviously, income security for children is impossible to achieve in isolation from the family and household context”** (p. 3). Thus, the policy measures necessary to achieve income security for children go well beyond the typical range of child and family benefits to include broader policies to advance **“productive employment, wages and incomes, access to healthcare, education and other social services, as well as gender equality and care arrangements”** (International Labour Office, 2015, p. 3). The report goes on to observe that the broad range of policies needed to address income security for children encompass the view of social protection reflected in the Joint Statement on Advancing Child-Sensitive Social Protection issued by a coalition of agencies in 2009 (DFID et al., 2009).

The UN Social Protection Floor, the 2009 Joint Statement on Advancing Child-Sensitive Social Protection, and the 2015 ILO analysis of social protection benefits for children and families each encompass a wide range of policies and desired outcomes. Similar to the UN and ILO definitions, the OECD has a broad definition of social protection, which covers all benefits that involve public and private transfers to households, the elderly, disabled, sick, or unemployed, or young persons. Private transfers between households, however, are excluded from this classification. In computing the cost of social protection benefits, the OECD's comprehensive measure of national social expenditures includes direct government spending, indirect spending through tax expenditures, and publicly mandated private benefits, as well as contributions to voluntary private social benefits (Adema & Ladaique, 2005).

Within this comprehensive accounting of social benefits, the OECD identifies a narrower band of social protection benefits that involve public spending on family

benefits, including financial support that is exclusively for families and children (OECD, 2017). This definition excludes benefits in other areas of social protection, such as health, wages, primary and secondary education, invalidity and housing, which also assist families, but not exclusively. The public spending on family benefits involves cash, in-kind and tax transfers (see Table 1).

Most of the so-called family benefits under the OECD concept are designed to make it easier for parents to maintain labor force participation, sometimes referred to as harmonizing work and family life. These benefits involve early education and childcare, maternity and parental leave, childcare tax credits and family benefits; they emphasize objectives related to gender equality, balancing work and family life, and child poverty (Lohmann, Peter, Rostgaard & Spiess, 2009). Although policies to balance work and family life are often referred to as family-friendly, some policy analysts observe that “market-friendly” is a more apt label (Gilbert, 2008). As Jane Lewis explains, family policy in the European Union **“has been explicitly linked to the promotion of women’s employment in order to further the economic growth and competition agenda”** (Lewis, 2006, p. 390). It has also been argued that these “family-friendly” policies actually create conditions for greater choice in terms of labor market participation or encourage what Esping-Andersen (1999) has identified as “defamilialization,” wherein the state assumes core functions of family life at the same time that much of household production is commodified (i.e., outsourced to the private market).

Table 1. OECD Family Policy Benefits

Family cash benefits	
Family allowances	Family allowances for children Family support benefits
Maternity and parental leave	Maternity and parental leave
Other cash benefits	Lone parent cash benefits Family other cash benefits
Benefits in kind	Family services
Day care/home-help services	Family day care Personal services Household services
Other benefits in kind	Household other benefits in kind

Source: The OECD Social Expenditure Database (1980-2001).

On the whole, the definitions of social protection proposed by the UN, ILO, OECD and other international agencies are concerned with guaranteeing a modicum of social and economic well-being, which in many ways parallels the conventional outcomes sought by the most progressive modern welfare states. These definitions reflect policies and practices designed to mitigate a wide range of risks and vulnerabilities faced by individuals and families over the life course. A limitation, as noted in the previous comments on “defamilialization,” is that in some cases these policies and practices can be at odds with the reciprocal obligations of intergenerational family solidarity.

In applying these definitions, empirical analyses of social protection often involve case studies and comparative assessments of countries, usually organized around analyses of:

- 1. Measures of social expenditure (e.g., type of welfare state, the overall percentage of GDP allocated to social protection, and the percentage to specific programs);**
- 2. Social protection programs in force and their design (e.g., which risks and population groups are covered, amount of benefits, and their indexation);**
- 3. The impact achieved by various measures (e.g., comparing the impact of unconditional cash transfers on poverty rates).**

These are all important analytic perspectives that provide valuable knowledge about different dimensions of social protection for individuals and families.

There are various measures of the current state of social protection. Gøsta Esping-Andersen's widely cited analysis of "The Three Worlds of Welfare Capitalism" (1990) used the decommodification of labor as one of the central characteristics to classify social welfare policy. He identified three ideal-type welfare state regimes: liberal (also called Anglo-American), conservative (sometimes referred to as continental European or Christian democratic), and social democratic (mainly found in the Scandinavian countries). Decommodification represents the extent to which social welfare policies allow recipients to maintain a socially acceptable standard of living regardless of their performance in the labor market; it is operationally defined by measures of the stringency of eligibility rules and the rate of income replacement for pension, unemployment and sickness benefits. Liberal regimes are typically represented by social policies with the lowest degrees of decommodification; conservative regimes score in the middle; and social democratic regimes rank highest on the decommodification index. According to Esping-Andersen's analysis, these welfare regimes emerged as a result of different sociopolitical interactions among unions, industrial interests and the state.

Although researchers have found the three-welfare-regime typology to be a useful perspective for describing and explaining cross-national differences, this typology has also been criticized on several counts. Some argue that the three regimes identified by Esping-Andersen's analysis of data from 1980 have begun to converge toward a neoliberal model in more recent years (Ferge, 1997; Gilbert 2002; Rojas, 2005). Others have claimed that the three regimes ignore the distinctive characteristics of welfare systems in the Mediterranean countries (Ferrera, 1996; Leibfried, 1993). And Van Voorhis (2003) reveals methodological flaws in the design and calculation of the decommodification index.

As a narrower, but more precise, gauge of social protection, the OECD index of Net Social Expenditure is the most rigorous metric of social spending. This comprehensive index of social spending introduces a model of social accounting that incorporates the cumulative value of direct public social expenditures, tax expenditures, publicly mandated private expenditures, and voluntary private social expenditures; the sum of

these benefits is then reduced by the cost of direct and indirect taxes on these benefits, which vary considerably among countries. The voluntary private social expenditures, such as employee health and pension benefits, typically promoted by tax breaks, constitute a substantial part of the total account devoted to social expenditure. Finally, the inclusion of publicly mandated private expenditures recognizes that governments can create social transfers through their powers of regulation. For example, governments can generate financial support for social protection through legislation that requires the private sector to provide social benefits such as employer payments for sickness and maternity leave (Adema, Einerhand, Eklind, Lotz, & Pearson, 1996). The most recent calculation of Net Social Expenditure shows the OECD member countries (wealthy industrialized democracies) spent an average of 21.4 percent of GDP on social welfare benefits (OECD, 2018).

From a broader perspective, the ILO's analysis of social protection worldwide includes countries from all regions of the world. This indicator reveals a tremendous variation in social expenditure and coverage among countries and regions of the world. The latest data show spending on social protection benefits range from 0.7 percent of GDP to 10.1 percent of GDP among countries in the Sub-Saharan region, and from 11.9 percent to 30.6 percent in the countries of Northern, Southern and Western Europe (International Labour Office, 2017; see Appendix E for details). The ILO report examines not only social spending but how many people are reached by these benefits. In terms of access, they report that only 45 percent of the world's population has access to at least one social benefit, and only 35 percent of children worldwide have effective access to social protection. Only 29 percent of the global population is covered by comprehensive social security.

As these data suggest, two of the key challenges to social protection involve spending and access. Social spending poses different problems for wealthy and poor countries. Among the wealthy countries of the OECD, there is growing concern about the ability to meet the heavy financial obligations for the array of existing social welfare programs, while responding to new demands for health and social care that arise from aging populations, as well as from single-parent and two-earner families. In the United States, for example, there is much talk about the social security crisis and the need to reduce benefits by raising the age of retirement or lowering payments (Gilbert, 2017). In the poorer regions of the world there is growing pressure to raise the low levels of spending on social protection and to promote universal access to basic social welfare benefits, while in the Arab region major challenges concern fragmentation, low coverage and financial unsustainability of formal social insurance. In the realm of social assistance, expenditures on universal fuel subsidies are higher than on other types of programs and investments; in contrast, healthcare systems are characterized by limited accessibility and adequacy, which result in high out-of-pocket payments by households. Additional pressure is imposed on social protection systems by the changing demographics (first and foremost by increasing life expectancy and decreasing fertility rates), family structures and family relations in the region.

CHAPTER THREE: WHY FOCUS ON FAMILY-SENSITIVE SOCIAL PROTECTION?

The changing patterns of family life include the increasing rates of divorce and single parenthood, the increasing number of elderly people living alone, the declining participation in bearing and rearing children, shifting patterns of female labor force participation, and almost miraculous medical advances in reproductive technology (United Nations, Department of Economic and Social Affairs, 2012; Ochiai, 1997; Ochiai and Molony 2008; Hakim, 2000; Mason & Ekman, 2017). As family historian Stephanie Coontz documents in her landmark work (2005; cited as one of the best books of the year), traditional norms of parental behavior are in flux as are the timing and means of procreation and the traditional gender division of labor in household production. Fewer people are getting married; couples who marry are doing so later in life, splitting up more frequently, having fewer children, and living longer than ever before. All these trends create respective implications for the social protection system.

Survey data from 22 countries in almost every region of the world confirm the pervasiveness of egalitarian sentiments regarding gender relations in family life (Pew, 2010). Solid majorities in every country surveyed supported women’s right to work outside the home, although most also agreed that when jobs are scarce men should have more of a right to jobs than women. Beyond gender relations in family life, the survey reports that in every country except Nigeria a substantial majority of respondents supported the broader claim that **“women should have equal rights”** (Pew, 2010). Similar results appear in other surveys. In the European Social Survey of 45,000 people in 25 countries, 85 percent of respondents agreed with the statement that **“men should take as much responsibility as women for home and children”** (European Social Survey, 2004).

This trend in the increasing expression of egalitarian attitudes can also be seen in an analysis of the International Social Survey Program’s data on 28,000 respondents from 16 countries representing Anglo-American, Northern European, Western European and East Asian welfare regimes (Hong & Gilbert, 2017). These data (Appendix A) illustrate that in every region both men’s and women’s attitudes toward gender roles in the division of labor in family life have become increasingly more egalitarian over the generations from 1910 to 2000. Following these shifts in social norms, social protection policies must adapt and create an enabling environment for women’s labor force participation by adopting a relevant legislative framework and putting in place services (a detailed description of relevant policies and services is given in the last chapter).

3.1. Fertility and Life Expectancy: The Demographic Transition

The degree and scope of these changes, of course, vary among countries and across regions. For example, the family’s performance of the essential functions of procreation and care for its members has been diminishing throughout the world. Since 1960 the fertility rate worldwide has plunged by about 50 percent, from 5 to 2.5 births

per woman. More recently, between 1990 and 2015 the worldwide total fertility rate (TFR) has declined by 33 percent. Indeed, over the last 25 years the TFR has fallen to a level that is well below the replacement rate of 2.1 in many upper-middle-income and high-income countries in Europe, East Asia and North America.

Although at 2.8 the average TFR for the Middle East and North Africa region remains well above the standard replacement level of 2.1, over the last 25 years this region experienced a proportional decline in fertility rate of 42 percent, the largest drop of all the regions in Table 2. In interpreting these data, it is important to recognize that the 2.1 replacement level does not account for infant mortality rates, which can vary dramatically among the MENA countries. For example, Qatar’s infant mortality rate of 5.8 is almost nine times lower than Yemen’s rate of 51.7. Moreover, the 2.8 average masks a considerable variance among the countries, ranging from the TFR lows of 1.7 in Lebanon followed by the United Arab Emirates with 1.8 and Qatar with 1.9 to TFR highs of 4.1 in Yemen and 4.7 in the Palestinian Territories (World Bank, 2017). In some instances there are considerable differences even within these countries; in Qatar, for example, the TFR for Qatari citizens is well above 2.1, while it is well below the rate for non-Qatari citizens, who constitute a large majority of the population (Gulf Cooperation Council, 2018). It has been suggested that with the conflicts and high infant mortality rates in places such as Yemen and the Palestinian Territories, high fertility rates can be seen as necessary for survival (Moghadam, 2013; United Nations, 2013). Thus, demographers estimate that actual replacement rates vary between 2.1 and 3.5 depending on factors such as infant mortality (Espenshade, Guzman, & Westoff, 2003).

Table 2. Total Fertility Rate

Total Fertility Rate	1990	2015
World	3.3	2.5
East Asia & Pacific	2.5	1.8
Latin America & Caribbean	3.2	2.1
Middle East & North Africa	4.9	2.8
European Union	1.7	1.6
North America	2.1	1.8
South Asia	4.3	2.5
Sub-Saharan Africa	6.3	4.9
Regions by Income Levels		
Low income	6.3	4.8
Lower middle income	4.3	2.8
Upper middle income	2.6	1.8
High income	1.8	1.7

Source: World Bank Data Extract World Development Indicators updated 2017.

The average fertility rate in the Arab region has been declining with the rising levels of women’s participation in the workforce and higher education (Moghadam, 2013; United Nations, 2013). Female labor force participation rates among the Arab countries vary from approximately 15 to 50 percent, a much wider range than in Western Europe (International Social Security Association, 2017; OECD, 2013; United Nations, 2013; United Nations Development Programme, 2005).

In general, analyses of demographic trends indicate that secular and highly educated segments of the population tend to reproduce at much lower rates than the religious, traditional, conservative segments of the population (Last, 2014; Longman, 2006). There is some evidence that countries in the Middle East and North African (MENA) region (which have practiced more religious observance in the 21st century than the advanced industrial democracies of the West) are growing less religious at the same time that there is increasing gender equality in education (Economist, 2017). Although solid majorities of the Muslims in seven MENA countries surveyed by Pew Research Center report that religion is very important, when it comes to differences by age the data in Table 3 show that those who are 35 and older are more likely than their younger counterparts to pray several times a day.

Table 3. Older Generation Prays More in Middle East and North Africa: % Who Pray Several Times a Day

	Aged 18-34	Aged 35+	Difference
Lebanon	47	75	28
Palestinian Territories	64	87	23
Tunisia	55	74	19
Morocco	61	79	18
Jordan	63	74	11
Iraq	82	90	8
Egypt	57	65	8

Source: Pew Research Center Q61.

While the data in Table 3 suggest a decline in religious observance among the younger generation compared to their elders in the MENA region, in most countries a considerable majority of their populations continue to pray regularly. This decline in religious observance might be linked to relevant weakening of traditional values and family ties promoted by the religion. Taking care of extended family members and intrafamily solidarity are a part of Muslim tradition, but when the role of the religion weakens, more and more people are left without family-based assistance. As seen in Table 4, this is in stark contrast to the degree of secularity in Europe, where on average less than one-third of the population attend religious services monthly.

Table 4. Religious Beliefs and Practices in Europe

Percentage who rated the importance of God in their lives as “10 ” on a 10-point scale	Percentage who attend religious services at least once a month	
Belgium	13	35
Finland	12	13
France	10	17
East Germany	13	20
West Germany	14	33
Great Britain	16	25
Iceland	17	9
Ireland	40	88
Italy	29	47
Netherlands	11	31
Norway	15	13
Spain	18	40
Sweden	8	10
Switzerland	26	43
European Average	17.3	30.3

Source: Inglehart, R. & Baker, W. E. (2000). Modernization, cultural change, and the persistence of cultural values. *American Sociological Review* 65(1), tables 6 and 7.

According to the Pew researchers, education also affects attitudes toward religion in some of the countries, such as Lebanon, for example, where 68 percent of respondents with less than a secondary education say religion is very important in their lives, compared with 41 percent of those with a secondary education or more (Pew, 2012). Similar findings of less religious practice among the younger generation are revealed in the 2012-2014 World Values Survey data, which show that respondents under age 30 were more likely to have reported never attending religious services than those over 50 years of age (Table 5). The results of this survey also show an inverse relationship between educational achievement and religious sentiments; that is, 27 percent of the respondents (in Iraq, Jordan, Lebanon and Tunisia) with some university education did not consider themselves to be religious people compared to 17 percent of those who did not complete primary education.

Table 5. How Often Do You Attend Religious Services? Those Who Answered “Never” Aged Under 30 and Over 50

Age	Iraq	Jordan	Lebanon	Tunisia	Egypt
< 30	26%	17%	16.6%	50.7%	36.2%
> 50	23.6%	7.7%	12.1%	24.2%	27.3%

Source: World Values Survey Wave 6: 2010-2014 <http://www.worldvaluessurvey.org/WVSOnline.jsp>, accessed 2/2/2018.

As for the increasing rate of gender equality in education, the ILO reports:

From a value of female/male enrolments of 40-50 percent at all levels of education in the 1960s, female-to-male enrolments have now almost reached parity at primary and secondary levels with a few exceptions, such as Morocco and Yemen. Furthermore, women have a higher enrolment rate in tertiary education than men in most countries, with the female share reaching nearly more than two-thirds in some GCC states, such as Kuwait and Qatar. (ILO, 2012, p. 81)

Despite these educational gains, the rate of female labor force participation remains relatively low in comparison to the global average.

If findings about the relationship between secularization, higher education and declining fertility rates can be generalized beyond the populations of Western democracies, then the increasing secularization and expanded educational opportunities suggest that the relatively high TFRs in the MENA region will continue to decline. Indeed, Eberstadt and Shah (2011) observe that **“there remains a widely perceived notion – still commonly held within intellectual, academic, and policy circles in the West and elsewhere – that Muslim societies are especially resistant to embarking upon the path of demographic and familial change that has transformed population profiles in Europe, North America, and other more developed areas.”** They argue, however, that these views do not reflect the important new demographic realities. As Figure 2 shows, the declining TFR of Arab countries in Western Asia closely tracks the worldwide trend.




Figure 2. Total Fertility (Live Births Per Woman)

Source: United Nations, Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Population Division (2017). World Population Prospects: The 2017 Revision. <https://esa.un.org/unpd/wpp/Graphs/DemographicProfiles/>

At the same time that family size has contracted due to the declining fertility rate, life expectancy rates have been rising throughout the world. Since 1960 average life expectancy worldwide has climbed from 53 years to 72 years. As shown in Table 6, this increase varies among regions, ranging from a high life expectancy of 82 years in the European area to a low of 60 years in Sub-Saharan Africa.

These demographic trends are generating an increasing challenge to both the family's and the state's capacity to care for elderly dependents. With fewer children being born as parents are living longer, the old age dependency ratio is rapidly rising. This ratio represents an indicator of the social and financial burden of elderly dependents on the working age population and on their family members. Over the next thirty-five years the number of people aged 65 years and older as a proportion of the working age population (15-64 years of age) is expected to climb from 13 to 25 percent worldwide, a relative increase of 92 percent.

Table 6. Life Expectancy

	1960	2015
World	53	72
East Asia & Pacific	49	75
European area	69	82
Latin America & Caribbean	56	75
North America	70	79
Middle East & North Africa	47	73
South Asia	42	68
Sub-Saharan Africa	40	60
High income	68	81
Middle income	48	71
Low income	39	62

Source: World Bank Data Extract World Development Indicators updated 2017.

As shown in Table 7, this substantial increase is projected for almost every region, except for Sub-Saharan Africa; here the elderly dependency ratio is expected to remain low and relatively stable, due largely to the region's high fertility rate and relatively low life expectancy. In Western Europe it is estimated that the number of elderly will amount to over 50 percent of the working age population.

Table 7. Elderly Dependency Ratio (Constant TFR)

	2015	2050
World	13	25
Western Europe	31	51
Latin America & Caribbean	12	30
North Africa	8	17
North America	22	36
East Asia	15	42
Western Asia	8	23
South East Asia	9	26
Sub-Saharan Africa	6	8

Source: United Nations, Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Population Division, New York. (2013). World Population Prospects: The 2012 Revision, Vol. 1, Comprehensive Tables.

Although the declining fertility rates and increasing life expectancy are relatively recent trends in Arab countries, the old age dependency ratio in Western Asia (a region that includes many Arab countries) is projected to rise from 8 percent to 23 percent. But there is considerable variation in the rise of dependency ratios among the countries in this region. For example, by 2050 the ratios in this region are projected to range from a low of 9 percent in Yemen to highs of 47 percent in Qatar, 42 percent in Lebanon, and 38 percent in the United Arab Emirates (United Nations, Department of Economic and Social Affairs, 2013). Projections of the changing age dependency ratio over this period of time require making assumptions about other factors that might come into play, such as migration rates of younger people, violent conflicts, changes in life expectancy, and fertility rates. The projections in Table 7 are based on the assumption of a medium level of fertility.

The climbing dependency ratio creates immense fiscal pressures on the state's and the family's efforts to support a growing elderly population. Many of the advanced industrialized countries with mature social security systems simply did not anticipate the remarkable increase in life expectancy since the second half of the 20th century. When Otto von Bismarck introduced the first state-sponsored social security scheme in 1889, life expectancy in Germany was only 45 years, while retirement was at age 65. When the Social Security Act of 1935 was passed in the United States, the average life expectancy of 61.7 years was 3 years below the standard age of retirement. By 2015, however, life expectancy in the United States had climbed to 79 years. Although the higher rates of infant mortality in 1935 accounted for some of this 17-year difference in life expectancy, the percentage of the male population over 18 years old that survived to age 65 in 2015 was almost double the adult survival rate in 1935 (Steuerle & Bakija, 1994). As the dependency ratio continues to climb, the US Social Security Trust Fund's Board of Trustees estimates that providing benefits under the current formula will result in a deficit of \$9.4 trillion over the next 75 years (OASDI Trustees Report, 2015).

Similar fiscal burdens are currently weighing upon the public budgets of many other advanced industrialized welfare states that provide substantial old age pensions. To ease the burgeoning costs of public pensions, toward the close of the 20th century seventeen European countries raised the statutory age of retirement, most often for women (Devereux, 2001). More recently, other countries are changing their work policies to encourage longer working lives. For example, Qatar is in the process of implementing policies to encourage elderly people to work in the private sector, while raising the retirement age from 60 to 65 (Permanent Population Committee, 2012).

However, the social and economic challenges posed by the increasing dependency ratios are not limited to the advanced welfare states. In the Arab region, in Egypt the liabilities of the pension system amounted to 141 percent of GDP as of 2006, while reserves were around 48 percent of GDP, and in the near future growing life expectancy will contribute to long-term unsustainability of the social insurance pension (Helmy, 2006). In regions of the world where publicly supported universal old age pensions are less fully developed than in the advanced industrial welfare states, the unmet needs generated by aging populations are expected to assume major proportions by 2050. In those Arab countries where the dependency ratios are projected to rise well over the world average of 25 percent, the growing need for elder care, a role tradition-

ally performed by women, is likely to generate tensions as women are increasingly participating in the workforce (De Bel-Air, 2016). An analysis of Arab pension systems concludes:

Despite the heterogeneity, common trends in all Arab countries include that fertility rates have been decreasing and life expectancy increasing. The elderly population will start to grow faster than the young population, putting pressure particularly on the finances of public pensions (and health insurance systems). Over the next 25 years, it is expected that the elderly population in the Arab region will grow at close to 4 percent per year while the total population grows at 1.4. (Price, Pallares-Miralles, Demarco, & Attia, 2017, p. 10)

Coverage currently afforded by old age pensions is typically low in Arab countries, with one estimate reporting that approximately 10 percent of the population aged 60 and older receive a pension (Price, Pallares-Miralles, Demarco, & Attia, 2017). Thus, the family provides more of a social safety net than social security systems (Olmsted 2005; Rashad, Osman, & Roudi-Fahimi, 2005). Since Arab families have historically assumed the major responsibility to care for the older generation, the increasing costs of an aging population will be carried largely by family members (Kárpáti, 2011). In 2004, for example, elderly people in Lebanon received 74.8 percent of their income from their children (United Nations, 2013).

Furthermore, elderly persons tend to have higher demands for healthcare services. In the Arab region a relatively high proportion of healthcare costs are covered by out-of-pocket spending. According to the World Bank in 2015, 31.5 percent of health expenditures came directly from the pockets of household members. This poses a large financial burden on elderly people and families taking care of elderly people.

As fertility rates decline, not only will financial pressures challenge the capacity of formal measures of social protection for the aged, but there will be fewer middle-aged family members to provide informal care for their elderly kin. In an analysis of the data on socioeconomic and demographic trends in the Arab region, and the debilitating impact of these trends on family supports, experts from the World Bank and the Arab Monetary Fund explain:

Most of the older population in the region must rely on family and other types of informal care or state transfers. With falling birth rates, rising life expectancies, changes in urbanization, migration, and family structures, the reach and scope of these informal arrangements have been weakening in recent years and will weaken further unless new policies to protect older adults are implemented. (Price, Pallares-Miralles, Demarco, & Attia, 2017, p. 35)

A shift is already taking place in this area for those who can afford to outsource elderly care, which in some countries includes lower-middle-income households; just as domestic workers are common for childcare, they assist too with at-home care of elderly kin. However, there are major differences in the degree of socioeconomic

pressure generated by an aging population in the Arab countries. The “good news,” as Puschmann and Matthijs (2015, p. 31) explain, **“is that during the next decades the richest Arab countries will be most affected by aging, while the poorest countries will be least affected. The Gulf States will be most affected, as fertility has declined profoundly, and life expectancy has risen spectacularly.”**

3.2. Weakening Family Ties and Stability: Marriage and Divorce

The stress of declining fertility and an increasing elderly population is compounded by changing social norms concerning marriage, divorce, and sexual mores, which have further disrupted the established patterns of family life around the world. These developments are often referred to as the second demographic transition, which began in industrialized countries and then spread to other parts of the globe (Lesthaeghe, 2010; Van de Kaa, 2002). In its most extreme form this change has been characterized as the “deinstitutionalization” of family life, exemplified in individualization, delayed parenthood, divorce, and single-parent households (Lundqvist & Ostner, 2017; Cherlin, 2004). Beaujot and Ravanera (2008, p. 78) note that **“the second demographic transition has been linked to secularization and the growing importance of individual autonomy. This includes a weakening of the norms against divorce, premarital sex, and voluntary childlessness.”**

With the advent of modern welfare states, in most of the advanced industrial societies families are no longer units of economic production where survival depends on a gender division of labor and relationships are bonded by an instrumental response to economic necessity. In this context family relationships increasingly serve expressive functions – nurturing, affection and emotional gratification. As family has become less a unit of economic production needed for survival and more a venue for the individuals’ emotional satisfaction, the ties of family relations have become increasingly vulnerable to the fulfillment of emotional expectations, which has diminished the stability of family life (Beaujot & Ravanera, 2008).

Of course, the extent of change varies in different regions, which contain diverse family structures, family processes, and cultural expectations. Generally speaking, the ties and stability of family life are on the wane, with marriage taking place later and becoming less common in many countries. Divorce has become more common in many regions and cohabitation is occurring more frequently in select regions.

Research findings indicate that the rising rate of cohabitation increases instability in the childrearing functions of family life; in almost every country, children born to cohabiting couples are more likely to have their parents split up by age twelve than those born into married families, regardless of the mother’s educational level (DeRose & Wilcox, 2017, p. 3; Mokomane, 2017).

The most palpable changes in the form and functioning of family life over the past three decades have occurred in developed countries (Bennet, 2011). In advanced industrialized welfare states of Europe and North America and parts of Asia, particularly Japan, Republic of Korea, Taiwan and Singapore, marriage rates have fallen precipitously. In

the United States, between 1980 and 2012 the percentage of women aged 40 to 44 who had never been married climbed from 4.8 to 13.8 percent (US Census Bureau, 1981; 2013). And remarriage rates (marriages after divorce or death of a spouse) between 1990 and 2011 declined by 40 percent, from about 50 per 1,000 previously marrieds to 29.4 per 1,000 (Brown & Lin, 2013). In Korea the proportion of married household heads declined from 79.6 percent in 1990 to 66.6 percent in 2010 (Kim, 2016). In Hong Kong the percentage of ever-married women aged 40 to 44 fell from 97.3 in 1981 to 83.5 percent in 2006, and in Japan it dropped from 95.1 in 1985 to 82.6 percent in 2010; Brazil experienced a 25 percent decline in ever-married women aged 40 to 44 over the thirty years from 1980 to 2010 (United Nations, Department of Economic and Social Affairs, 2012).

Similar declines in ever-married rates for women aged 40 to 44 have occurred across Western Europe (United Nations, Department of Economic and Social Affairs, 2012):

Table 8. Marriage Rates

Country	Decline over 21–30 years
Austria	91.8 percent in 1981 to 79.5 percent in 2011
Denmark	94.3 percent in 1985 to 78.2 percent in 2011
France	92.5 percent in 1985 to 72.1 percent in 2009
Germany	93.6 percent in 1990 to 75.9 percent in 2011
Norway	93.9 percent in 1986 to 72.2 percent in 2010
United Kingdom	94.4 percent in 1981 to 78.0 percent in 2009

In many countries the declining marriage rates have been accompanied by a rising tide of cohabitation. The number of US adults in cohabiting relationships climbed 29 percent between 2007 and 2016 (Stepler, 2017). The percentage of all US couples that are cohabiting has increased by 29% between 2007 and 2016 (Pew Research Center, 2017).

Cohabitation rates in large parts of Europe tend to be higher than in the United States. Between 1995 and 2010 the rate of cohabitation rose in France from 13.6 percent to 24.4 percent, in Germany from 8.2 percent to 12.8 percent, in the Netherlands from 13.1 percent to 20 percent, in Sweden from 23 percent to 25 percent, and in the UK from 10.1 percent to 15.5 percent (Popenoe, 2008; OECD, 2013). In 2010, over 40 percent of births in France, Norway, and Sweden were to women in cohabiting relationships, compared to 25 percent in the United States (Perelli-Harris & Gassen, 2012; Payne, Manning, & Brown, 2012).

In France the normative shift away from the traditional marriage commitment is manifest in the public's acceptance of cohabitation among well-known political leaders. For example, Ségolène Royal, the French Socialist Party's 2007 presidential candidate, and François Hollande, the party's leader, lived together for twenty-five years; and then Defense Minister Michèle Alliot-Marie was in a long-term cohabitation with a member of the National Assembly.

Although many parts of the Arab world are also experiencing changes in the established patterns of family life, the data on family trends are not as readily available as in other regions, and the degree of change is open to differing interpretations. It is antic-

ipated that in the next few years research will emerge as a result of a call for action for quality research on the Arab family (Qatar National Research Fund, 2015). Currently, the available data show that it is relatively clear that fertility rates have fallen and the age of marriage is rising in many Arab countries. Rashad (2015, p. 1) observes:

The Arab region has, and is continuing, to experience significant changes in marriage and family formation patterns. A number of earlier studies have shown that, despite the diversity of Arab countries in terms of their positions within the stages of nuptiality transition, they have all experienced important changes in the tempo and intensity of marriage, as well as in the characteristics of marriage and marriage partners.

However, analysts sometimes differ in how they characterize the overall degree of change in traditional commitments to family life and living arrangements. Similar to Rashad, for example, Eberstadt and Shah (2011) claim that in the Arab world **“traditional marriage patterns and living arrangements are undergoing tremendous change”** (p. 3). In contrast, Puschmann and Matthijs (2015) find that despite some similarities to the experience in many advanced industrialized countries, in the Arab world important features of this change **“are (still) absent or are only present in an embryonic phase”** (p. 48). Specifically, they observe that the Arab world has not experienced a weakening of the marriage institution reflected in growing rates of cohabitation, high divorce rates and a climbing number of out-of-wedlock births, which are increasingly common in other regions of the world. Although marriage rates remained fairly constant in many Arab countries, in Qatar the rate per 1,000 inhabitants fell for males from 29.4 in 2009 to 24.1 in 2015 and for females from 27.7 in 2009 to 22.2 in 2015 (Ministry of Development Planning and Statistics, 2016).

Unlike the normative shift in Europe, cohabitation and out-of-wedlock births are unlawful in many Arab countries and in some cases can lead to imprisonment, which are reasons to believe that such behaviors remain relatively rare (Puschmann & Matthijs, 2015). However, Puschmann and Matthijs recognize it is **“perfectly feasible that the next generation of young people in the Arab world will experience a cultural and a sexual revolution similar to Europe in the 1960s”** (2015, p. 26). Indeed, they see some signs of this already under way in the rising ages of marriage, the transition from arranged marriages to free partner choice, the rise of nonconventional marriages that avoid the costs of a traditional wedding party, a decline in polygamy, and more generally in the changing attitudes and behavior of the younger generation.

As evidence of these changes, Bakass and Ferrand report, for example, that in Morocco **“women’s mean age at marriage rose from 17.5 years in 1960 to 25.8 years in 1994 and 26.2 years in 2004; it has continued to increase since then, especially in urban areas, but now appears to be leveling off at around 26 years”** (2013, p. 38). More generally, Puschmann and Matthijs observe: **“Today ages have gone up. In several Arab countries the singulate mean ages at marriage (SMAM) among females have risen to around 30, and considerable proportions of women marry in their thirties.”** (2015, pp. 17-18) Regarding the rise in nonconventional marriages, Rashad and colleagues suggest that the high costs of Arab marriages and economic difficulties account

“for the spread of so-called ‘urfi’ (or common-law) marriages among young urban adults in some countries in the region” (2005, p. 7). They also find anecdotal evidence of an increase in other forms of nonconventional marriage, such as **mut’a** (temporary marriage) and **messyar**, (an arrangement under which the man does not assume all the financial responsibilities of a standard Arab marriage). Although these latter arrangements apply mostly in cases when men are marrying a second wife, Tabutin and Schoumaker (2005) find overall that polygyny is showing clear signs of decline, with the proportion of women in polygynous unions at around 3-5 percent in North Africa (Tunisia excluded), Palestine, and Syria, with a higher level of around 9 percent among countries on the Arabian Peninsula.

A serious challenge to traditional attitudes toward sexual relations emanates from the rising age of marriage, which has climbed to a mean of around 30 years for single women in several Arab countries. The requirement for girls to remain virgins until marriage is considerably more stressful when they first marry on average at age 30 than when they first marry at the age of 18. Restraining their intermingling and sexual behavior with men for an additional 12 years of adult life places tremendous pressures on traditional attitudes. Despite the rising age of marriage, a number of countries are still challenged with relatively high rates of early marriage. Rashad (2015) identifies seven countries in the Arab region – Mauritania, Sudan, Yemen, Iraq, Palestine, Syria and Egypt – where between 17 and 34 percent of women are married before their eighteenth birthday.

Without claiming that a sexual revolution is afoot, some evidence suggests that attitudes and behaviors concerning relationships are changing. Although there is strong religious and moral disapproval in Arab countries of sexual relations before marriage, Bakass and Ferrand observe that the rising age of marriage **“suggests that first marriage no longer systematically coincides with first sexual intercourse”** (2013, p. 39). They say “suggests” because empirical data on the sexual behavior of unmarried persons in Arab countries are extremely rare. Among the limited evidence that exists they cite a Moroccan study which found that 34 percent of the young women surveyed reported having their first sexual relations before marriage. In their qualitative study, which included a sample of 50 women, Bakass and Ferrand found a consensus for abiding by the rules while secretly evading them, but mainly through nonpenetrative sexual relations. A relaxed attitude toward contact between singles is expressed in survey data from the Arab Human Development Report, which reveal that on average a majority of respondents from Jordan, Lebanon, Egypt, and Morocco agreed to the general intermingling of men and women in society and in all stages of education (United Nations Development Programme, 2005).

Developments such as these among the younger generation in the Arab world may be a harbinger of a larger cultural adaptation to the demographic changes and social patterns which are diminishing the bonds of marriage and family life in many of the advanced industrial countries. Furthermore, higher divorce rates, growing prevalence of informal cohabitation, **urfi** (common-law) marriage, **mut’a** (temporary marriage) and **messyar** (marriage with limited financial responsibility for a man) make women more vulnerable to economic shocks in case of separation or death of the partner, particularly considering their low labor market participation and social insurance coverage, limited labor rights, etc.

Although the Arab family has always played a key role in providing financial and social support to its dependents, Jawad’s assessment (2014) that in recent years the Arab family has become a less reliable source of support due in part to the breakdown of family bonds concurs with Price, Pallares-Miralles, Demarco, and Attia’s analysis (2017, cited earlier). This assessment is further confirmed by Kronfol, Rizk and Sibai’s (2015) examination of the shifting dynamics of intergenerational cohesion in Arab countries. Among the various factors impacting family solidarity, they note that demographic transitions, shifts in social norms, and economic pressures, as well as medical advances and the ensuing changes in health patterns in later life, are triggering various forms of estrangement from the traditional family configuration and have resulted in fundamental changes in old age care. This has come to be problematized as **“the fraying in the social cohesion between generations”** (p. 386).

Although daughters and daughters-in-law have traditionally assumed responsibility for the provision of care to the elderly in Arab countries, Kronfol, Rizk and Sibai (2015) observe a change in these norms, which has been documented in a number of countries:

The traditional nuptial tenets of the Arab countries – generally characterized by early marriage for women, universal marriage for both sexes and large age differences between spouses – have in many respects changed greatly over the past century in a drastic shift that Tabutin and Schoumaker (2005) call the “marriage revolution.” This, and the increased entry of women in the workforce, may contribute towards unraveling the existing multigenerational household pattern and necessitate changes in familial roles, which carry a set of gendered duties and responsibilities for family members, including the young and old. (p. 38)

CHAPTER FOUR: FAMILY-SENSITIVE SOCIAL PROTECTION: DEFINING FAMILY

Changes in the demographic structure and the weakening of family bonds challenge the capacity of this institution to perform the family's essential functions of procreation, socialization, nurturing of the young, care for dependents, the transmission of cultural values and affective gratification.

In response to the challenges posed by the changing patterns of family relations, many countries have reformed and extended state-sponsored measures for social protection. A range of policies have emerged for the care and support of children, persons with disabilities and elderly family members, widows, divorced women, and families below the poverty line. Diverse public measures have been implemented to restructure family allowance schemes, to harmonize work and family life, to provide housing for newly-weds and parenting education, and to address the implications of cohabitation for welfare eligibility. For example, Sweden has implemented parenting support programs that involve twenty-three interventions designed to improve parenting skills, provide behavior-oriented strategies and promote healthy parent-child relationships; and Norway initiated parenting support programs that include twenty types of intervention (Sundsbo, 2018). Between the mid-1980s and the late 1990s the family policy systems in both France and Belgium underwent a shift away from general access to public childcare services and towards an alternative model that supported private and family-based forms of care; this change was implemented through the introduction of long parental leaves and special allowances to help parents pay for in-home care or a family daycare provider (Podestà, 2017). After the mid-1990s Italy introduced the foster allowance, a payment to families who care for dependent elderly members (Degiuli, 2016). And while still publicly financed, the delivery of many family-oriented social benefits has been increasingly outsourced to the private sector.

In analyzing how these measures for social protection are assessed through a conceptual lens of Family-Sensitive Social Protection, we must first come to grips with the issue of defining the parameters of the “family” in question. This is a complex issue in that there are diverse family arrangements that satisfy human needs, have strengths and weaknesses, and seek to qualify for public recognition and social supports. There are families in which several generations live together, families with two parents married and unmarried, one-parent families, polygamous families, families without children, homosexual families, and other variants (Sugarman, 2008). Other variants may include the consequences of modern medical technology wherein one woman's egg may be implanted in the uterus of another and impregnated by a third party, raising issues of multiple parentage (Mason & Ekman, 2017). The prevalence of different family arrangements varies among countries and regions around the world; for example, the proportion of children living with two parents is on average much higher in Arab countries and India than in Latin America, the United States, Korea and Western Europe (Child Trends, 2014; United Nations Development Programme, 2005; Kim, 2016). While the nuclear family predominates in North America, in Arab countries it is relatively rare for a household to contain just a nuclear family; instead, Arab

family arrangements are more varied and could be comprised of a father’s sister who is a widow, married sons and their wives, or a husband and multiple wives with their children (United Nations, 2013; De Bel-Air, 2016).

Moreover, efforts to identify the human relationships that define “family” as a category for social protection encounter what might be called an “egalitarian dilemma,” which dictates equal protection for all forms of human relationships. Carried to the extreme, as it sometimes is, this concern for treating everyone the same can extend beyond the categories of single-parent families, two-parent families, multiple-partner families, unmarried families, and same-sex families to include even the “single-person family,” as described under the equal access rule of the US Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD Exchange 2014):

“Family” includes, but is not limited to, regardless of marital status, actual or perceived sexual orientation, or gender identity, the following:

- 1. A single person, who may be an elderly person, displaced person, disabled person, near-elderly person, or any other single person; or,**
- 2. A group of persons residing together, and such group includes, but is not limited to:**
 - a. A family with or without children (a child who is temporarily away from the home because of placement in foster care is considered a member of the family);**
 - b. An elderly family;**
 - c. A near-elderly family;**
 - d. A disabled family;**
 - e. A displaced family; and,**
 - f. The remaining member of a tenant family.**

The dilemma here is that if the definition of “family” becomes a vessel into which every imaginable human relationship can be poured, there is no basis for distinguishing family-oriented social protection from any measure that would promote social protection. On the other hand, the identification of preferable family types to receive social protection benefits results in some groups getting more public support than others, and the accompanying danger of stigmatizing those not fitting into the preferred definition of family (Gilbert, 1983). The challenge of defining “family” is further compounded by the fact that among the diverse family arrangements that exist around the world several, such as same-sex families, cohabitants and polygamous families, are legal in some countries and prohibited or severely disapproved of in others.

All of this is to say that the definition of family is often highly contested, which explains why a recent draft UN report notes that international standards do not prescribe a specific concept of family, and suggests that the family should be understood “in a wide sense” (Gennarini, 2016). This wide sense is reflected in the preamble to the Convention on the Rights of the Child, which describes the family as **“the fundamental group of society and the natural environment for the growth and well-being of all its members and particularly children”** (Child Rights International Network, n.d.).

Political considerations aside, a more specific definition of family is difficult to agree upon because, practically speaking, as Coontz (2000, p. 19) observes, **“there is no universal definition of family that fits the reality of all cultural groups,”** whether based on structural, functional or psychological criteria. Nor is there a universal definition that captures various dimensions such as formality (marriage, cohabitation, temporary marriage, common-law marriage), marriage type (monogamous, polygamous), location (patrilocal, matrilocal), authority (patriarchy, matriarchy), and kin composition (nuclear, extended). Based on a definition of family as **“people related by marriage, birth, consanguinity or legal adoption, who share a common kitchen and financial resources on a regular basis,”** Sharma (2013, p. 307) defines seven categories of family type using terms borrowed from physics such as nuclear, atom, proton. But even here he finds exceptional cases that do not fit into the classification scheme.

The term “family” has many justifiable meanings, which depend in part on whether it is being interpreted from a socioeconomic, biological, or cultural perspective. Recognizing that alternative family arrangements may receive legal sanction and public approval in different countries around the world, for the purpose of this report the meaning of “family” in the concept of Family-Sensitive Social Protection is defined as:

People in a committed stable relationship (whether linked by marriage, common-law, domestic partnership, contract or other interpersonal commitments) and their intergenerational dependents, based on birth or adoption, who perform the functions of procreation, socialization, nurturing of the young, care for the elderly, and mutual aid and companionship.

This is a broad though not all-encompassing definition that emphasizes firm and stable interpersonal ties and intergenerational relations and obligations, but leaves open the matter of the gender of people in these committed relationships. By including dependable interpersonal ties, intergenerational relations, and responsibilities for the essential functions of family life, this definition distinguishes Family-Sensitive Social Protection as those measures that strengthen the family unit’s capacity to perform these functions as a basic building block of society. Although functions of family life such as caring for children can be performed by the state, private agencies and friends, this definition of Family-Sensitive Social Protection emphasizes strengthening the family’s capacity to manage that responsibility rather than leaving it to outside agents.

Others have maintained that in analyzing the impact of social policies on families it is not necessary to offer a specific definition of “family,” suggesting instead that the definition of family will vary depending on the policy objectives (Bogenschneider, Little, Ooms, Benning and Cadigan (2012). From this perspective, in the case of caring for children, as long as the policy provided for some person or agency to provide the care, it would be seen as family policy.

Several objections to the specific definition of “family” in the formulation of Family-Sensitive Social Protection are that it neglects to cover single-parent families, single-person families, childless couples, and loosely tied casual cohabitation. There

is strong evidence that children born into these less stable arrangements, sometimes referred to as “fragile families,” fare worse than children born into married-couple households on a number of cognitive, behavioral and health outcomes (McLanahan, 2011; Waldfogel, Craigie, & Brooks-Gunn, 2010). That is, compared to children from traditional married families, children from fragile families are more likely to be overweight or obese, to be diagnosed with asthma, to have been hospitalized in the past year, and to have had accidents or injuries over the past year; they are less likely to graduate from high school or college, and more likely to become teenage mothers, to exhibit aggressive behavioral problems, and to score lower on the Peabody Picture Vocabulary Test. Many one-parent families, of course, do a fine job of raising healthy and successful children. But as Perlstein (2014, p. 127) observes, **“two-parent families offer no guarantees when it comes to kids doing well – just much better odds.”**

The dilemma of not offering a specific definition of family, leaving it open to all types of interpersonal arrangements, is sharply illustrated in President Carter’s announcement of the 1980 White House Conference on Families. He noted that two of the “growing problems” confronted by American families were that 40 percent of marriages ended in divorce and one child in eight was born outside of marriage (problems that continue to affect family life). While indicating that these problems needed to be addressed, Carter went on to promise that the White House Conference on Families would recognize and respect the pluralism of family life, noting: **“There are families in which several generations live together, families with two parents and one, and families with and without children. The Conference will respect this diversity.”** (Carter, 1978, p. 251) But one-parent families are typically the result of divorce, desertion and children born outside of marriage, identified as “growing problems” just few sentences earlier. These opening comments begged the question of whether one-parent families and unstable arrangements should be addressed as growing problems that need to be rectified, or as expressions of diversity to be respected, perhaps even encouraged? (Gilbert, 1983)

The White House Conference adopted more than 150 recommendations, touching on every facet of social protection for individuals and groups, including care for the elderly and disabled, housing, financial assistance, employment, gender equality, childcare and addictions. It also called for family impact analysis (White House Conference on Families, 1980). In the end, it was a message to expand the broad safety net of social protection for individuals and families, which offered no indication of whether any form or functions of family life merited support.

It is important to understand that in conceptually focusing the lens of Family-Sensitive Social Protection on measures that enhance strong interpersonal bonds and intergenerational relations, which facilitate performing the basic functions of families, this perspective on social protection does not deny the wide-ranging benefits of social protection to any of the people in other types of family arrangements. Indeed, as previously noted, the policies and practices of social protection as typically defined extend to single-parent families, single-person families, childless couples, and co-habiting partners. And as we will see, the alternative perspectives from which one may analyze the impacts of social protection include the full array of social provisions that lend support to all types of families and individuals.

CHAPTER FIVE: FAMILY-SENSITIVE SOCIAL PROTECTION: IMPACT ANALYSIS

As suggested above and in other sections of this report, there is an extensive literature defining social protection and analyzing its implications. The task of developing an analytic framework on “Family-Sensitive Social Protection” requires distinguishing it from related (and overlapping) analyses of social protection previously described, which focus on various objectives such as reducing poverty, increasing gender equality, and facilitating employment. Much has already been written about the impact of social protection on these issues and their implications for various groups. This literature can be seen as a series of frameworks which provide alternative lenses through which to analyze the impact of social protection policies and programs (illustrated in Figure 3).

In analyzing the impact of social protection measures, these different lenses can be focused widely on the general public or more narrowly on specific vulnerable groups. The poverty lens, for example, can examine the entire population of poor people in a country or zero in on various segments of the population such as poor people in single-parent households and those over 65 years of age. Focusing broadly, Korpi and Palme (1998) compared the impact of social welfare transfers on poverty in eleven countries. Although they found a greater reduction of poverty in the countries favoring universal policies, several other studies have challenged this finding (Kenworthy, 2011; Marx, Salanauskaite, & Verbist, 2013; Brady & Bostic, 2015). Applying a different lens and a narrower perspective, a United Nations report (United Nations, Department of Economic and Social Affairs, 2018) examines the contribution of social protection to social inclusion, with a focus centered on seven groups: children, youth, older persons, persons with disabilities, international migrants, ethnic and racial minorities, and indigenous people. Analyzing the impact of social protection through this lens highlights the question: To what extent do programs and policies promote the social inclusion of these disadvantaged groups? Using the lens of child-sensitive measures of social protection, Samson, Fajth, and François (2016) focus on the connection between the provision of nutrition, care, learning and security and the development of intellectual skills and executive function skills in children, which ultimately translate to “cognitive capital.”



Figure 3. Impact Analyses: Alternative Perspectives on Social Protection

Source: Author

Family-Sensitive Social Protection (FSSP) is a conceptual lens that directs our attention to the impact of social protection measures on the bonds and functioning of family life. This analytic perspective is not as well developed as other assessments of social protection policy. As Bogenschneider and Corbett noted in 2010, **“family policy remains undeveloped as a focus of intellectual inquiry despite the growing reach of public policy on families”** (p. 783).

As it is being proposed here, the concept of FSSP is operationally defined as social protection programs and benefits that support family formation, choice, interdependence and solidarity, which promote the vitality of family life and its capacity to perform the essential functions of procreation, socialization of the young, care for dependent members, mutual support and companionship. From this perspective, the concept of Family-Sensitive Social Protection raises an alternative set of questions about the impact of social protection, which are framed by the overarching objective of reinforcing the institution of family – the basic building block of society – over the life course. Within this concept we understand that family must be the central actor in performing functions of procreation, socialization of the young, care for dependent members, mutual support and companionship.




Figure 4: Family-Sensitive Social Protection: A Life Course Perspective: Stages of Family Life Course

In focusing on how to strengthen the stability and vitality in family life over the life course, this framework extends our line of vision beyond the widely-used OECD conceptualization of family policy, which tends to emphasize programs and benefits clustered around efforts to harmonize work and family life during the early years of childrearing. The FSSP perspective shifts our analytic focus from asking about the impact of social protection on poverty, gender equality, healthcare and education to how the wide array of social protection policies and programs impact the formation and strength of family life throughout the life course, and to what extent they facilitate the formation of stable, cohesive families, as illustrated in the following examples related to the early and middle stages of family life.

Starting with the formation of committed relationships, among which marriage creates the strongest bonds and formal obligations between spouses, the FSSP lens draws our attention to questions such as the immediate economic consequences of means-tested social protection benefits for marriage in the advanced industrial welfare states. An early analysis of economic disincentives to marriage in the United States estimated that if a low-income single mother were to marry a low-income partner, the loss of means-tested welfare benefits could reduce their combined income by as much as 30 percent (Steuerle, 1999). However more recent and detailed analyses, which include the impact of both taxes and means-tested benefits, reveal greater complexity in the incentive structure. That is, factoring in both means-tested benefits and taxes, marriage can result in either financial penalties or bonuses for cohabitating partners with children, depending on their levels of income and how earnings are split between them (Maag & Acs, 2015; Besharov & Gilbert, 2015). While financial costs and benefits of means-tested programs may inhibit or encourage marriage, there are other social welfare transfers designed specifically to promote marriage, for example, special housing allowances, cash bonuses, and subsidized wedding venues. The impacts of these various programs remain uncertain. Questions about the extent to which economic incentives can influence decisions around marriage and cohabitation open a meaningful line of policy research.

Beyond the implications for marriage, social protection policies related to the early stages of family life have a significant bearing on the family function of procreation. Growing interest in these policies is driven by low fertility rates in many regions, which have spurred concerns about population decline. A range of policies have been designed to increase fertility rates through monetary and material incentives and other measures aimed at reducing the socioeconomic cost of childbearing. In 2015 Turkey began offering a one-time cash benefit for the birth of children, with an increase for each child: 300 Turkish lira for the first child, 400 Turkish lira for the second, and 600 (approximately \$162) for four or more (De Bel-Air, 2016). The government of Qatar, in its 2012 Population Status report, aimed to bolster fertility by allocating grants to newborn infants, encouraging widowed women and divorced women to marry, and creating a “distinction” for the most reproductive families (Permanent Population Committee, 2012).

In the European Union, a comprehensive package of so-called family-friendly benefits including cash and services has been widely available for decades (Gornick & Meyers, 2003; Guo & Gilbert, 2007). A number of East Asian countries, such as China, Japan, Taiwan, Hong Kong, Singapore and South Korea, have among the lowest fertility rates in the world. These countries contain a mix of policies offering different levels of support intended to lift the TFR. Singapore has one of the most comprehensive packages of policies aimed at encouraging marriage and childbearing. Hong Kong offers a modest tax break for parents of newborns, and China eliminated the government restriction that had been imposed by the one-child policy.

To date, the overall impact of various pro-natalist measures has been ambiguous. In regard to the European experience, Joelle Sleebos’s analysis of forty-two multivariate studies of family-friendly policies found the evidence inconclusive and contradictory (Sleebos, 2003). This reminds us of the history of children’s allowances in France, initiated under the Family Code of 1939. These allowances were designed with explicit pro-natalist objectives. And indeed, the French birthrate increased considerably in the decades after World War II. However, the birthrate in the United States – which had no children’s allowance – also rose dramatically during the same period, while the birthrate in Sweden declined despite its children’s allowance system (Schorr, 1965).

In East Asia both the modest tax break for newborns in Hong Kong and the more comprehensive package of family policies in Singapore have been in place for many years. Despite the major differences in the levels of support for marriage and childbearing, these countries have almost identical fertility rates (Gietel-Basten, forthcoming). And in China, the removal of the one-child policy does not yet appear to have had the expected impact on the fertility rate. The reform of China’s policy allows for a second child, but not to a single parent.

Once children arrive, parents are called on to create a secure home in which the nurturing, caring, socialization and affective functions of family life are performed. These require labor-intensive and time-consuming efforts, as well as substantial knowledge of child development and parenting skills, particularly during the children’s preschool years – caring for children during this period is a 12-to-14-hour-a-day, seven-day-a-week job. During this stage, the personal demands of childrearing and ambitions of

parental employment create tensions, particularly for mothers who have traditionally assumed the major responsibilities for childcare.

Social insurance policies can be family-sensitive if, for example, health insurance of the working family member is automatically extended to his or her dependents; survivorship laws allow dependents to inherit pension benefits of the deceased breadwinner; or social insurance contributions have child credits or deductions. Even old age pensions can be seen as an indirect means of family-sensitive social protection, because of the high level of redistribution within families: there are cases where an old age pension is the only source of existence for a whole family with children.

Conditional cash transfers (CCT) are an important tool to alleviate poverty and improve income security, and to facilitate higher educational enrollment and regular health monitoring of children in the Arab region. These transfers are cash money provided to families (or households) with children on the condition that specific investments in human capital (in the first line into education and healthcare of children) will be made. Most common conditionalities – i.e., conditions for receiving transfers – include regular medical checkups and vaccinations for children and mothers' perinatal care, and children's school enrollment and attendance. Sometimes transfers also depend on children's school performance and participation of parents in educational and information events on health, nutrition, parenting, civic participation, entrepreneurship, etc. Conditional cash transfers can be either means-tested (i.e., provided to poor households) or categorical (provided to a population group).

The majority of the countries in the Arab region have some kind of conditional cash transfer scheme targeted at families with children. The most prominent are Takaful in Egypt, Tayssir in Morocco, etc. Takaful CCT was launched in 2015 with the conditionality of school enrollment for children aged 6-18 and above median attendance for secondary students, health visits, growth monitoring, vaccinations, and antenatal and postnatal care for mothers. Impact evaluation of the program revealed that Takaful increased household monthly expenditures and reduced probability of poverty, and – although school attendance and health conditionalities have not been implemented yet – significantly increased beneficiary families' spending on school supplies and transportation.

Some cash transfers (conditional and unconditional) target vulnerable families, e.g., Fonds d'entraide familiale in Morocco targeting divorced poor mothers and their children; social insurance benefits in Qatar targeting, among others, divorced (non-re-married) women, families without a breadwinner, abandoned wives, and widows (all without insufficient income).

Similarly, a large number of other social protection programs in the region support access of children to education by reducing families' education-related expenses, e.g., school feeding programs (Djibouti, Egypt, Kuwait, Morocco, Saudi Arabia, Sudan, etc.); in-kind transfers providing school materials and books (Algeria, Morocco); and educational fee waivers (Machado, Bilo, Soares & Osorio, 2018). Furthermore, some countries introduced legislation extending healthcare coverage to children at no or minimal cost, e.g., in Egypt Law 99 of 1992 mandated health insurance for school and kindergarten children, and Decree 380 of 1997 covered newborn children.

Furthermore, cash-for-work or affordable/social housing programs can also be seen as family-sensitive social protection if they prioritize workers from the families with children.

Food assistance to vulnerable families can also have family-sensitive design, like, for example, in Egypt, where electronic smart (ration) cards are issued on a per family basis and give access to poor families to a monthly allowance of 50 Egyptian pounds (\$2.8) per registered person to be spent on food items according to household preferences. Unfortunately, the total number of family members registered under one card is limited to four persons. Another example of food assistance is programs aimed at prevention of malnutrition in pregnant and lactating women and small children. These programs exist in a number of countries in the Arab region and are often implemented in partnership with the World Food Programme (WFP).

Various social protection policies, such as home visiting and parenting support programs, and public childcare services and subsidies, have been designed in response to the needs and demands at this stage of family life. The lens of FSSP focuses our attention on measuring the extent to which these programs have an impact on family life. Do they enhance the family's capacity for nurturing, caring and socialization of children?

Such social policies and programs, aimed at supporting family formation and parenting, and empowering families, may include, among others:

- educational campaigns (including media, school meetings, info-letters, and brochures);
- universal or targeted home visiting to carry out health and development checks, counseling and education (USA, UK, UNICEF Better Parenting Program in Jordan, etc.);
- regular screening to monitor children's development, and anticipatory guidance of parents;
- helplines and other community resources, including counseling (premarital, pre- and postnatal), and thematic programs (Reach Out and Read (US), etc.);
- parent support groups to share information about parenting and child development;
- parent engagement into school activities (meeting teachers, learning education techniques, goal setting and establishing routines); and
- counseling, education and coaching to address specific issues.

A considerable body of research on home-visiting services in the United States suggests that this program, which involves teaching mothers about effective parent-child interactions, health, safety and cognitive development, has a measurable impact on the quality of parental functioning (Daro, 2009; Olds et al., 2004; Olds et al., 2014). Unlike public childcare, which substitutes the state for the family, home-visiting services strengthen family solidarity by reinforcing the bonds between parents and children and shoring up the family's role in the social, emotional and moral development of their newborn members.

However, a qualitative analysis of parenting programs in the Nordic countries raises the question of whether these programs strengthen family or **“represent an expression of the welfare state expanding its mandate of taking responsibility for children’s development, also discussed as the dialectic relationship of defamilialisation/refamilialisation”** (Sundsbo, 2018, p. 438). Here, some see an issue of whether government should dictate how parents raise their children, forcing parents (usually mothers) to adopt middle-class attitudes and practices (Gillies, 2005).

CHAPTER SIX: RESEARCH, NORMATIVE AND CONCEPTUAL ISSUES

The issue of government's role in raising children is even more central to the policy choice between the provision of public childcare and the offer of an equivalent sum as an allowance paid to parents for providing care to their preschool children at home. Although a number of European countries, including Austria, France, Norway and Finland, offer the choice of cash-for-care benefits or public daycare, the payment for home care has been a topic of heated debate. This is because cash for home care is perceived as keeping mothers out of the labor force and creating a large gap in their resumés, which would limit future employment opportunities (Erlandsson, 2017; Sipilä, Repo, & Rissanen, 2010).

Seen through the analytic lens (Figure 3) of labor force participation, the provision of state-subsidized daycare services is preferable, in that it promotes a higher level of employment among parents with young children than the state-subsidized home-care allowance. Similarly, from the perspective of gender equality the impact of subsidized daycare appears to provide women more equal opportunity for labor force participation than the subsidized home-care allowance (since mothers would be more likely than fathers to use the home-care allowance). In contrast, however, through the lens of Family-Sensitive Social Protection, the impact of providing parents the choice between public daycare and home-care allowances is seen as affording those who prefer to invest their time and effort in the care, nurturing and socialization of their children the same opportunity as those who would rather be employed in the "real" work of the formal economy. That work, of course, includes the care of other people's children by paid employees of public daycare centers, which are disproportionately staffed by women.

As these examples illustrate, the conceptual lens of Family-Sensitive Social Protection exposes researchers and policy makers to thinking about alternative impacts of social programs and policy.

Further arising in the realm of family-sensitive social protection is the question of level of benefits: how to make family/child benefits adequate but not overly generous, which might discourage labor force participation of parents and encourage them to pursue a strategy of having as many children as they can to secure income (which is the case in some developed countries)?

Approaching social protection measures from this analytic perspective raises research, normative and conceptual issues that are outside the purview of other perspectives.

The research issues concern the impact of social protection on the institution of family life, addressing questions such as:

- How do social supports for marriage, such as housing for newly-weds, interest-free loans for dowries and marriage bonuses, impact the formation of cohesive families?

- What is the impact of subsidized public daycare on the estimated market value of home care of children?
- What is the impact of policies and programs designed to help parents balance work and family life on childbearing and the cohesive bonds of family life?
- How can social protection policies be designed to facilitate intergenerational transfers that support adult children caring for elderly parents, and grandparents in caring roles for their grandchildren?
- What is the impact of home visiting and mother-child home educational programs on parental capacity for nurturing, caring and socialization of their children?

The FSSP lens also brings to light underlying normative issues about what constitute desirable arrangements of family life, and the role of the state in assuming family functions; these issues include:

- Should the design of social protection benefits provide incentives that foster independence and an equal division of labor, or an interdependent partnership between spouses, which allows them to decide how to divide their labor in performing the essential functions of family life?
- In pursuit of gender equality, to what extent should social protection benefits promote the shift of household labor to the market, in the course of which the performance of care, nurturing, and other family functions are outsourced to the market and the state?
- In pursuit of individual freedom and autonomy, to what degree should the state allocate social benefits that relieve parents of their responsibilities to provide care, nurturing, socialization and mutual support in family life – otherwise referred to as defamilialisation (Esping-Andersen 1999)?

In addressing the questions raised from the FSSP perspective, a key conceptual issue involves the operational definition of a stable, cohesive family. Measures of family solidarity and social cohesion are less well developed than the various empirical impact measures related to alternative perspectives on social protection that focus on poverty, economic equality, gender equality, or labor force participation. While stability can be roughly estimated according to the length of relationships, and divorce rates may be taken as indicators of weak bonds/instability, these surface one-dimensional indicators convey a shallow sense of social cohesion and solidarity. Seeking criteria that capture some more essential indicators of family solidarity, Beaujot and Ravanera (2008) suggest an operational measure based on the giving and receiving of emotional support, the amount of time spent with family, and the degree of functional exchange among members.

6.1. Challenges: Conflicting Objectives and Unanticipated Consequences

The design and implementation of FSSP is challenging, in part because there are limits to what governments in democratic societies can do to affect individual values and behaviors that would stabilize and reinforce the family unit. And within these limits the evidence of how social protection measures impact family life is partial and incomplete, as reflected in the range and types of issues listed above. Added to this uncertainty is the realization that social protection programs can support some important objectives, such as reducing poverty, increasing food security, and promoting early development of children and their access to healthcare and education, while at the same time having an unanticipated consequence of generating a disincentive to forming stable relationships (Besharov & Gilbert, 2015).

The tensions that may arise between FSSP and other major objectives of social protection policies can be seen in cash, services and regulatory benefits for social protection. Currently, for example, there is mounting interest in the provision of a universal basic income to reduce poverty, with pilot programs undertaken in a few countries (although Finland's experiment was recently closed). Several experiments with basic income programs have taken place over the years, starting in the mid-1970s with the US program known as the Seattle and Denver Income Maintenance Experiments (SIME/DIME). At that time, SIME/DIME was arguably the largest and most carefully controlled income maintenance experiment in history. The experiment involved 4,706 families, of which 44 percent were randomly assigned to the control group with the remaining families divided into experimental groups, each receiving guaranteed annual income going as high as \$5,600 (over \$30,000 in 2017 adjusted for inflation).

Although the SIME/DIME grants reduced poverty among the recipient families, there were competing hypotheses regarding the potential effects on family life. On the one hand, since financial stress is a major factor for increasing the risk of divorce, access to reliable financial aid could help to stabilize family life (Cutright, 1971; Anderson, 1978). On the other hand, providing mothers an assured source of support outside of marriage could serve to reduce the material incentives to get or stay married (Goode, 1962).

As it turned out, the rate of marital dissolution for experimental families was approximately twice that of control group families (Hannan, Tuma, & Groeneveld, 1977). There were some anomalies amid these startling results, and although findings were highly suggestive of the short-term consequences of this program, its long-term effects on marital stability remain unknown (Munnell, 1987). It is conceivable that after the initial round of divorces the remaining pool of married couples and those who remarried would experience lower divorce rates than the current level. Also, some might argue that if the grants allowed women to exit unhappy marriages, the outcomes were not all that undesirable. Indeed, if some of these women were in abusive relationships, being given the financial means to exit must count as a beneficial outcome. Still, from the analytic perspective of FSSP, the immediate results did not reinforce the bonds of family life, which raises the question: Is there a way to design the basic income benefit that might inhibit its potential to destabilize marriage?

Conflicts can also emerge between the objective of advancing gender equality in the workforce and the FSSP objective of promoting the family's capacity for the socialization and nurturing of children. For example, the 2012 Qatar Population Status report (Permanent Population Committee, 2012) describes an initiative to assist employed women in performing childcare functions by endorsing part-time work for women and the possibilities for them to work from home. The issue in this case is similar to the debate over the cash-for-care policy in Sweden, which was abolished in 2016 (Giuliani & Duvander, 2017). It involves the conflict between promoting parental (mainly mothers') investment in the socialization and nurturing of young children in the home versus striving for gender equality in the marketplace through full-time employment outside the home.

CHAPTER SEVEN: BASIC TENETS OF FAMILY-SENSITIVE SOCIAL PROTECTION (FSSP)

FSSP involves social policies and programs that are empirically shown to promote stable families and their ability to perform the central functions of family life: procreation, socialization of the young, care for dependent members, and mutual aid and companionship over the life course.

7.1. Formation of Stable Families

Practically speaking, there are limits to what governments in a democratic society can do to influence couples' decisions to enter into formal commitments and maintain stable long-term relationships. But social policies can provide marriage counseling (which will be easy in the Arab countries where it is necessary to obtain a marriage permission or premarital screening certificate (UAE, Saudi Arabia, Qatar), and furnish economic incentives and disincentives for commitments to marriage, civil unions, registered partnerships and other formal bonds; similarly, social policies can offer incentives and disincentives for dissolving these bonds. Financial penalties are often imposed when a low-income recipient of a means-tested social transfer, such as Section 8 housing vouchers in the United States, marries a partner with a higher income. At the same time, in countries such as Singapore public housing benefits are linked to marital status. In the United States, if a widow remarries before age 60, she loses the right to her ex-spouse's social security benefits. In Qatar, although a policy to provide subsidized housing to divorced women provided a degree of security and independence, it was also perceived by some as making it easier for both parties to dissolve marriages. In some cases marriage bonuses, such as a lump-sum cash benefit, have been advanced as incentives to form the bond. Austria abolished its marriage grant in 1986. Here, findings suggest that the marriage boom in the second half of 1987 was caused by the announcement in August 1987 that the marriage grant would be cut by January 1988 (Winkler-Dworak & Engelhard, 2004), though it is not known how many of these couples would have entered into marriage at some later date regardless of whether or not a grant was forthcoming. In implementing and reforming social policies such as those mentioned above, the tenets of FSSP direct planners and policy makers to study and report the empirical evidence regarding the impact of these measures on the formation of stable family bonds.

7.2. Procreation

Over the years, different governments have tried to generate positive and negative influences on the level of procreation. The one-child policy in China exemplifies a coercive measure designed to constrain procreation; and, as previously noted, there is a long history of children's allowances, designed as incentives to advance pro-natalist objectives, which do not seem to have had empirically confirmed effects. It is difficult to assess the impact of financial incentives such as children's allowances on procreation, in part because a variety of factors may influence the outcomes, including

exogenous factors such as business cycles, societal conflicts, and normative changes, as well as endogenous effects, including the size and length of coverage of the allowance and the possibility of heterogeneous effects according to economic classes and religious affiliations of recipients. There are claims that customary packages of family policies such as parental leave and day care, which facilitate the mother's on-going participation in the labor force, have a positive effect on the fertility rate. For example, Rindfuss and Brewster (1996) argue that anything that decreases existing childcare provisions or increases the cost of childcare “**would likely lead to a swift decline in fertility**” (p. 283). But the empirical findings are inconclusive; moreover, few, if any, of the countries which provide these benefits have lifted their total fertility rate above the replacement level.

Measures designed to facilitate both parents' labor force participation promote a **concurrent** model of balancing childrearing and employment at the same time, that might not be preferred by all the potential parents thinking about having children. Even with maternity leave and the public provision of childcare, childbearing and raising children during the preschool years involve a tremendous amount of daily work, which places considerable strain on two parents employed full-time. An alternative approach to balancing childrearing and employment involves a **sequential** model, which takes a long view of parenting and labor force participation over the life course. Here, the balance between parenting and labor force participation involves not trying to do it all at the same time, but rather allocating these activities in such a way that stay-at-home parents (who would usually, though not always, be mothers) care for the children full-time during the early years of childhood and then spend the remaining thirty to forty years in paid employment. Social policies that support the **sequential** model recognize the economic value of home care through the provision of benefits such as home-care allowances (childcare salary) and social security credits for the early years of full-time parenting work (Leipert & Opielka, 1999; Sipilä, Repo, & Rissanen, 2010). Even in the United States, as far back as 1980 the White House Conference on Families (1980) recommended providing special tax credits for full-time homemakers. Under the **sequential** model, home-care benefits need to be supplemented by social policies that facilitate the transition into the paid labor force once the children are of school age. Such measures have already been introduced in several countries. In 2000, France offered a return to work incentive for women, which involved a cash benefit for mothers who had stayed at home to care for children under the age of six and were now ready to enter the labor force; similarly, Australia offers a return to work benefit to parents who have stayed home to care for their preschool children (Gilbert, 2008). There is currently no firm evidence comparing the extent to which **concurrent** and **sequential** models may impact procreation. The impact of social protection measures on childbearing is a facet of family life that calls for more thorough research and policy experimentation.

7.3. Socialization of the Young

Although schools, religious bodies, peer groups and other parties contribute to the socialization of children, their families play the primary role and are the foremost agents of socialization, particularly in the crucial early years. Socialization of children is an ongoing, time-consuming process that involves continuous interpersonal interactions. When young children spend most of their waking hours five days a week under the supervision of publicly subsidized daycare workers, the daily responsibility for a significant part of the socialization function shifts from the family to the state. There are many valid reasons for and objectives to be served by the provision of publicly provided daycare services. However, as seen through the lens of FSSP this social benefit does not advance the opportunity for parents to perform the one of the essential functions of family life. While social policies that compensate the care work of stay-at-home parents expand the **opportunity** for parental socialization of young children through their continuous presence and daily interactions, they do not guarantee positive results. Moving beyond expanding opportunities for daily contacts and exchanges with children, social programs such as home visiting by social workers and pediatric nurses are designed to enhance socialization through instruction and training in constructive parent-child interactions.

7.4. Care for Dependent Members

Although young children are dependent members in the early stages of family life, in the later stages their elderly and widowed parents often have need for care. With populations aging around the world, the demand for elderly care is rapidly rising. At the same time, as the age at birth of first child climbs to the late twenties and early thirties, many parents find themselves “sandwiched” between the needs of their growing children and those of their elderly parents. Similar to the FSSP policies that provide economic supports to promote parental home care of young children, such policies have also been designed to provide pension credits and cash payments for family home care of elderly parents and disabled members (Daly, 2001; Barr & Coulter, 1990).

7.5. Mutual Aid and Companionship

Strong family unions involve not only the intergenerational bond of obligations to care for dependent members, but also a commitment to mutual aid and companionship between parents. Mutual aid and companionship are promoted by social protection benefits that reinforce the sense of a partnership between parents. In a partnership the division of labor is organized according to the members’ skills and preferences in order to further the family’s well-being. Sometimes social protection policies are designed in a way that incentivizes labor force participation of one family member rather than the other; for example, in Syria survivorship benefits are granted to a broader category of dependents when a male is insured as compared to a women. This may involve different investments of time and effort in paid employment, domestic work, care work, voluntary

service and other activities. Recognizing the value of different investments of time and effort to the joint enterprise, in the parental partnership it is fair that each member receives an equal share in the assets and social benefits accrued by both parties. From the perspective of FSSP this translates, for example, into policies that endorse splitting the combined benefits and credits from public and private pensions between spouses. Going beyond pension benefits, in the United States there are community property laws in nine states which impart recognition to the egalitarian ideal of stable family unions as a partnership. Under these policies husbands and wives are each entitled to one-half of all employment income received, including pension benefits, and all property acquired during the marriage. There is evidence that cash transfers given to female members of households may increase their bargaining power in the family and promote higher gender equality.

7.6. Empirical Analysis

FSSP does not just offer a conceptual lens to focus policy makers' attention on the consequences of social protection for family life. In addressing the extent to which social protection policies strengthen the bonds of family life by supporting stable relationships and the ability to perform the central functions of family over the life course, FSSP requires conducting empirical analyses to evaluate the impact of these policies on family life. The design of such analyses involves operationally defining the outcome measures of interest regarding each of the functions identified above. This encompasses a wide range of social indicators, some more sharply defined than others. For example, change in fertility rates would seem a reasonable social indicator for policies concerning procreation. The impact on stable family bonds could include social indicators such as the changing proportions of marriage, civil unions and other formal contracts, rates of divorce, the average length of formal unions, and levels of domestic violence. Indicators of mutual aid and companionship could focus upon joint bank accounts, family decision-making processes, frequency of family dinners and vacations, and sharing family responsibilities. And socialization indicators might take account of the amount of time spent with children, activities engaged in with children, and behavioral measures of children in school. The empirical assessment of FSSP also needs to be sensitive to the possible heterogeneity of effects, which could reveal diverse family impacts of policies on different population groups.

CHAPTER EIGHT: POLICY IMPLICATIONS: AUTHORIZING FAMILY IMPACT REPORTS

The conceptual framework for Family-Sensitive Social Protection (FSSP) offers an alternative lens through which to assess a vast array of social protection measures. It is a lens that highlights the importance of parents' formal commitments to family life and of the essential bonds between parents and children, which are forged in the home, not in the commercial market or the public daycare center. Unlike other analytic frameworks on social protection which focus on designing and assessing the effects of policy measures on particular problems such as poverty, unemployment, inequality, educational achievement, and health, FSSP is concerned with the impact of social policies on the more general institution of the family, which involves spousal and intergenerational interactions over the life course.



This report opened with the observation that the family is often referred to as the basic building block of society. In seeking to strengthen the stability and functioning of this institution, the introduction of the FSSP framework has significant implications for the development and reform of social protection policy. Just as policy makers require the preparation of Environmental Impact Reports to insure a sustainable physical environment, necessary for survival, an argument can be made for the authorization of Family Impact Reports to insure the strength of an institution essential to the well-being of our social environment.



As a policymaking tool, Environmental Impact Reports analyze potentially detrimental effects of proposed physical developments, identify possible ways to alleviate those effects, and formulate reasonable alternatives to the proposed developments. In a similar vein, Family Impact Reports would analyze proposed social protection measures and reforms, focusing on their consequences for the stability and functioning of family life. Family Impact Reports would serve as an ex-ante evaluation of social protection policy proposals, assessing their relevance to the institution of family life and potential consequences, positive and negative, for the performance of its essential functions. In analyzing these potential consequences of proposed social policies, the Family Impact Report would specify the research questions, address the operational measures, and explicate the normative issues related to this analysis, laying the foundation for an ex-ante assessment of the likely effects and an ex-post impact evaluation of the policy assessing its actual consequences. Through this process, Family Impact Reports heighten policy makers' awareness and stimulate their thinking about the ways public measures can be designed to strengthen the bonds of family life.

Overall, there are two principles governments should follow when designing family-sensitive social protection programs:

- the programs should be strategically oriented and comprehensive in their nature; and
- specially designed means of social protection should be available during all stages of the family life cycle (from premarital counseling of parents to programs for adolescents to intergenerational supports for elderly members).

APPENDIX A: ATTITUDES TOWARD INCREASING EQUALITY IN THE GENDER DIVISION OF LABOR IN FAMILY LIFE, BY WELFARE REGIMES*, GENERATIONS AND GENDER 1910-2000





Source: Cheng Huie Hong and Neil Gilbert, “Cognitive Dissonance: Attitudes toward gender roles in the division of labor in family life in East Asian and Western industrial countries” paper presented at the International Perspectives on Current Issues in Family Policy Seminar, University of Malaga, May 31, 2017.

*Welfare Regimes: Anglo-American: Canada, UK, US, Australia; Northern Europe: Norway, Sweden, Denmark, Finland; Western Europe: Germany, France, Belgium, Netherlands, East Asia: China, Japan, Taiwan, South Korea.

APPENDIX B: ASIA

Eastern Asia	South-Central Asia	South-Eastern Asia	Western Asia
China	Central Asia	Brunei Darussalam	Armenia
China, Hong Kong SAR	Kazakhstan	Cambodia	Azerbaijan
China, Macao SAR	Kyrgyzstan	Indonesia	Bahrain
Democratic People's Republic of Korea	Tajikistan	Lao People's Democratic Republic	Cyprus
	Turkmenistan		Georgia
Japan	Uzbekistan	Malaysia	Iraq
Mongolia		Myanmar	Israel
Republic of Korea	Southern Asia	Philippines	Jordan
Other nonspecified areas	Afghanistan	Singapore	Kuwait
	Bangladesh	Thailand	Lebanon
	Bhutan	Timor-Leste	Oman
	India	Viet Nam	Qatar
	Iran (Islamic Republic of)		Saudi Arabia
	Maldives		State of Palestine
	Nepal		Syrian Arab Republic
	Pakistan		Turkey
	Sri Lanka		United Arab Emirates
			Yemen

APPENDIX C: PARTICIPANTS IN THE FSSP CONSULTATION MEETING IN DOHA, JUNE 26-27, 2018

Douglas Besharov, USA

Norman and Florence Brody Professor at the University of Maryland School of Public Policy; Senior Fellow at the Atlantic Council.

Sergei Zelenev, USA

Executive Director of the International Council on Social Welfare.

Adib Nehmeh, Lebanon

Adib Nehmeh held the position of Regional Advisor on Governance and State Building at the UN Economic and Social Commission for Western Asia (ESCWA) based in Beirut.

Timo Fleckenstein, UK

Associate Professor of Social Policy, London School of Economics.

Antonio López Peláez, Spain

University Full Professor of Social Work and Social Services at the Department of Social Work, Faculty of Law, National Distance Education University (UNED).

Traute Meyer, UK

Professor of Social Policy, University of Southampton.

Jacqueline O'Reilly, UK

Professor of Comparative Human Resource Management (Business and Management) at the University of Sussex.

Marit Skivenes, Norway

Professor at the University of Bergen, Director of the Centre for Research on Discretion and Paternalism and chair of the research group DIPA (Discretion and Paternalism).

Carolina Muñoz-Guzman, Chile

Associate Professor in the School of Social Work at the Pontificia Universidad Católica de Chile.

Fathia Abdel Fadil, Sudan

First Social Affairs Officer, ESCWA Social Development Division.

Hmoud Olimat, Jordan

Professor of Social Work, Qatar University.

Michael Samson, South Africa

Director of Research, Economic Policy Research Institute.

APPENDIX D: AGENDA, FAMILY-SENSITIVE SOCIAL PROTECTION PROJECT EXPERT MEETING, JUNE 26-27, 2018

Day 1

9:00 – 9:30: Welcome

Welcome and Introductions

Ms. Noor Al Malki Al Jehani – Executive Director of Doha International Family Institute (DIFI)

Fathia Abdel Fadil – United Nations Economic and Social Commission for Western Asia (ESCWA)

Neil Gilbert – Professor of Social Welfare and Social Services, University of California, Berkeley

9:30 – 11:00 Panel Presentation 1: (3-4 participants; 15-20 minutes each)

Guaranteed Income/Unconditional Cash Grants and Family Life

- Overview of how family life is changing in the country or region with which you are familiar.
- Discussion of the implications of guaranteed income programs for the stability and cohesion of family life.
- Questions and Open Discussion.

Session Chair: **Neil Gilbert**, Professor of Social Welfare and Social Services, University of California, Berkeley

11:00 – 11:30 Break

11:30 – 13:00 Panel Presentation 2: (3-4 participants; 15-20 minutes each)

Means-Tested Social Benefits and the Formation of Stable Families

- Overview of how family life is changing in the country or region with which you are familiar.
- Discussion of incentives and disincentives for the formation of stable families generated by means-tested social benefits such as social assistance, housing subsidies and children's allowances.
- Questions and Open Discussion.
- Session Chair: **Neil Gilbert**, Professor of Social Welfare and Social Services, University of California, Berkeley

13:00 – 14:00 Lunch

14:00 – 15:30 Panel Presentation 3: (3-4 participants; 15-20 minutes each)

Cash Versus In-Kind Social Benefits

- Overview of how family life is changing in the country or region with which you are familiar.
- Discussion of the implications of cash-for-care compared to publicly subsidized childcare services for family-sensitive social protection.
- Questions and Open Discussion.

Session Chair: **Neil Gilbert**, Professor of Social Welfare and Social Services, University of California, Berkeley

7:30 Dinner

Day 2

9:00 – 10:30 Panel Presentation 1: (3-4 participants; 15-20 minutes each)

Marriage Benefits to Encourage Family Life

- Overview of how family life is changing in the country or region with which you are familiar.
- Discussion of the effects of financial supports for marriage such as housing for newly-weds, interest free loans for dowries, and marriage bonuses. Do they encourage the formation of cohesive families?
- Questions and Open Discussion.

Session Chair: **Neil Gilbert**, Professor of Social Welfare and Social Services, University of California, Berkeley

10:30 – 11:00 Break

11:00 – 12:30 Panel Presentation 2: (3-4 participants; 15-20 minutes each)

Work-Oriented Benefits and Family Life

- Overview of how family life is changing in the country or region with which you are familiar.
- Discussion of how social protection measures such as paid parental leave, part-time work and early childcare may impact childbearing and socialization functions of family life.
- Questions and Open Discussion.

Session Chair: **Neil Gilbert**, Professor of Social Welfare and Social Services, University of California, Berkeley

12:30 – 13:30 Lunch

13:30 – 15:00 Panel Presentation 3: (3-4 participants; 15-20 minutes each)

Social Protection and Alternative Family Structures

- Overview of how family life is changing in the country or region with which you are familiar.
- Discussion of social protection measures for alternative family structures and their ramifications for strengthening solidarity in family life.
- Are there social protection measures to stabilize and reinforce the family unit that might be particularly well suited to the modern Arab family?
- Questions, Open Discussion and Final Comments.

Session Chair: **Neil Gilbert**, Professor of Social Welfare and Social Services, University of California, Berkeley

APPENDIX E: SOCIAL PROTECTION WORLDWIDE: PERCENT OF GDP, BY COUNTRY

Country / territory	Latest available	Year
Africa		
Northern Africa		
Algeria	8.5	2011
Egypt	11.2	2015
Libya	6.6	2010
Morocco	6.6	2010
Sudan	2.3	2010
Tunisia	10.4	2011
Sub-Saharan Africa		
Angola	6.0	2015
Benin	4.2	2010
Botswana	6.6	2010
Burkina Faso	2.7	2015
Burundi	4.9	2010
Cabo Verde	6.9	2010
Cameroon	2.3	2010
Central African Republic	2.6	2012
Chad	1.3	2010
Congo	2.2	2012
Congo, Democratic Republic of the	3.5	2012
Côte d'Ivoire	2.0	2015
Djibouti	7.3	2007
Equatorial Guinea	2.8	2010
Eritrea	1.6	2011
Ethiopia	3.2	2010
The Gambia	4.2	2014
Ghana	5.4	2010
Guinea	2.5	2010
Guinea-Bissau	5.4	2010
Kenya	2.3	2012
Lesotho	16.3	2011
Liberia	3.3	2015
Madagascar	0.7	2014
Malawi	#REF!	2015
Mali	4.9	2010
Mauritania	4.9	2010
Mauritius	9.8	2014

Country / territory	Latest available	Year
Mozambique	4.5	2015
Namibia	6.7	2015
Niger	2.9	2010
Nigeria	0.7	2013
Rwanda	7.3	2010
Sao Tome and Principe	4.0	2014
Senegal	5.3	2010
Seychelles	7.5	2015
Sierra Leone	4.2	2005
South Africa	10.1	2015
Swaziland	4.4	2012
Tanzania, United Republic of	6.8	2010
Togo	2.6	2014
Uganda	2.2	2015
Zambia	5.5	2011
Zimbabwe	5.6	2011

Americas

Latin America and the Caribbean

Antigua and Barbuda	7.1	2011
Bahamas	4.9	2015
Barbados	11.4	2010
Belize	4.6	2015
Bolivia, Plurinational State of	10.2	2014
Brazil	18.3	2015
Chile	15.3	2015
Colombia	14.1	2015
Costa Rica	13.6	2015
Cuba	18.0	2011
Dominica	8.0	2010
Dominican Republic	6.4	2014
Ecuador	7.8	2014
El Salvador	11.6	2015
Grenada	4.3	2010
Guatemala	4.4	2011
Guyana	8.2	2010
Haiti	3.3	2013
Honduras	4.4	2010
Jamaica	4.4	2011
Mexico	12.0	2015
Nicaragua	6.3	2005

Country / territory	Latest available	Year
Panama	9.8	2015
Paraguay	6.4	2010
Peru	5.5	2015
Saint Kitts and Nevis	5.6	2010
Saint Lucia	6.0	2010
Saint Vincent and the Grenadines	8.2	2010
Trinidad and Tobago	9.0	2010
Uruguay	17.0	2015
Venezuela, Bolivarian Republic of	8.8	2015
Northern America		
Canada	17.2	2015
United States	19.0	2015
Arab States		
Bahrain	4.0	2010
Jordan	8.9	2015
Kuwait	11.4	2011
Lebanon	2.1	2015
Oman ⁴	3.8	2013
Qatar	1.7	2010
Saudi Arabia	3.6	2011
Syrian Arab Republic	1.9	2010
United Arab Emirates	5.0	2015
Yemen	9.6	2012
Asia and the Pacific		
Eastern Asia		
China	6.3	2015
Hong Kong, China	2.7	2015
Japan	23.1	2013
Korea, Republic of	10.1	2015
Mongolia	14.4	2015
Taiwan, China	9.7	2010
South-Eastern Asia		
Brunei Darussalam	2.3	2011
Cambodia	1.2	2013
Indonesia	1.1	2015
Lao People's Democratic Republic	1.2	2013
Malaysia	3.8	2012

Country / territory	Latest available	Year
Myanmar	1.0	2011
Philippines	2.2	2015
Singapore	4.2	2015
Thailand	3.7	2015
Timor-Leste	3.3	2014
Viet Nam	6.3	2015
Southern Asia		
Afghanistan	2.8	2013
Bangladesh	1.7	2014
Bhutan	2.7	2014
India	2.7	2014
Iran, Islamic Republic of	12.5	2010
Maldives	4.2	2011
Nepal	3.0	2015
Pakistan	0.2	2014
Sri Lanka	6.5	2015
Oceania		
Australia	18.8	2015
Fiji	3.4	2015
Kiribati	12.0	2015
New Zealand	19.7	2015
Palau	7.1	2015
Papua New Guinea	3.6	2015
Samoa	2.0	2015
Solomon Islands	6.6	2015
Europe and Central Asia		
Northern, Southern and Western Europe		
Albania	11.9	2015
Austria	28.0	2015
Belgium	29.2	2015
Croatia	21.6	2014
Denmark	28.8	2015
Estonia	17.0	2015
Finland	30.6	2015
France	31.7	2015
Germany	25.0	2015
Greece	26.4	2015
Iceland	15.7	2015

Country / territory	Latest available	Year
Ireland	17.0	2015
Italy	28.9	2015
Latvia	14.4	2015
Lithuania	14.7	2014
Luxembourg	22.2	2015
Malta	18.2	2014
Netherlands	22.3	2015
Norway	23.9	2015
Portugal	24.1	2015
San Marino	21.4	2010
Serbia	23.4	2014
Slovenia	22.4	2015
Spain	25.4	2015
Sweden	26.7	2015
Switzerland	19.6	2015
United Kingdom	21.5	2015
Eastern Europe		
Belarus	19.4	2015
Bulgaria	18.5	2014
Czech Republic	19.5	2015
Hungary	20.7	2015
Moldova, Republic of	18.1	2015
Poland	19.4	2015
Romania	14.8	2014
Russian Federation	15.6	2015
Slovakia	19.4	2015
Ukraine	22.2	2015
Central and Western Asia		
Armenia	7.6	2015
Azerbaijan	8.2	2015
Cyprus	23.0	2014
Georgia	10.6	2015
Israel	16.0	2015
Kazakhstan	5.4	2015
Kyrgyzstan	9.0	2014
Turkey	13.5	2014
Uzbekistan	11.6	2014

Source: International Labour Office. (2017). World Social Protection Report 2017-19: Universal social protection to achieve the Sustainable Development Goals. Geneva: ILO.

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